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ABSTRACT
This dissertation treats a variety of topics in the computer security domain which have direct
impact on everyday life. The first extends false data injection attacks against state estimation in
electric power grids and then provides a novel power flow model camouflage method to hamper
these attacks. The second deals with automotive theft response, detailing a method for a car to
intelligently identify when it has been stolen, based on collected behavioral traits of its driver.
The third demonstrates a new attack against the content integrity of the PDF file format, caus-
ing humans and computers to see different information within the same PDF documents. This
dissertation lastly describes some future work efforts, identifying some potential vulnerabilities in
the automated enforcement of copyright protection for audio (particularly music) in online systems
such as YouTube.
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Active participation in modern society requires engaging with various computer systems con-
stantly, albeit sometimes unknowingly. The populace relies on the safe and accurate usage of these
systems to maintain the current state of normalcy. For example, computer systems ingest usage or
purchase data to inform as to when, where, and how much of any given product should be shipped.
The importance of this in regards to simple items such as food needs no description. More funda-
mentally, the growing number of computer systems within vehicles enable their safe and reliable
operation, enabling people to travel or, referring to the previous example, enabling anything at all
to be shipped. More fundamentally still, computer systems are integral to the safe and reliable
generation and distribution of energy, whether considering plants using fuel to generate electricity
or the refinement of that fuel itself. In short, computer systems enable (1) generation of energy,
(2) application of energy for useful actions, and (3) optimized performance of those actions, and all
three of these technological “layers” are required for a stable civilization as we presently experience.
I consider these systems which support modern society as “everyday computer systems,” and the
fact that they are all required means that each layer must be individually protected to prevent
large problems from arising throughout.
These everyday systems have seen many research efforts to improve their function, and ensuring
that their security keeps pace with their technological innovation is paramount. In my research
efforts, I have examined systems from the fundamental to the applied, and this dissertation presents
the security concerns and improvements therein which I have been able to find. The first is in that
foundational layer of power generation and examines false data injection attacks against state
estimation in electric power grids. The second appears in the layer of applying energy for useful
actions and deals with automotive security, particularly theft response. The third lies within
that top layer of optimizing useful actions and describes an attack against the accurate virtual
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representation of data using the PDF file format. This dissertation lastly describes some future
work efforts also in the top layer, wherein there may be some vulnerabilities in the automated
enforcement of copyright protection for audio in online systems such as YouTube. In the rest of
this Introduction appears a brief description of each work.
As previously mentioned, the functioning of the power grid is the very basis for modern society.
This dissertation examines the power flow model for Direct Current (DC) electric power grids, which
has been previously used in research [1] to launch false data injection attacks (FDIAs) against state
estimation, harming the process used by grid administrators to preserve grid stability. This work
recognizes that FDIAs may be just one attack building from the power flow model, and that the
presence of power grid topology information within the model implies that its discovery may also
facilitate topology-based attacks. Herein is shown a means by which an attacker can derive the
power flow model, and in so doing, the topology as well. By using pairs of meter measurements
and state variables, the attacker may exploit the inherent sparsity of the model to perform this
reconstruction. Next, with less than complete data, this work finds that an attacker can accurately
reconstruct regions of the model, or topology, which has relaxed requirements on the attacker but
may be all that is necessary for an attack to be made. This work also illustrates how to cause such
an attacker to derive instead a convincing fake model, or portion thereof, by applying camouflage
to the real model. With this camouflage in place, no sensitive information will be leaked, so
attacks based on this fake model will not be effective but will rather alert grid administrators
to the attacker’s efforts. Using five test cases included in the MATLAB power flow analysis tool
MATPOWER, ranging in size from 9 to 300 buses, this work verifies the ability to reconstruct
portions of or the complete power flow model from meter measurements and state variables, as well
as the efficacy of the camouflage in masking the real model. An average 67.0% of the topology may
be derived, with an overall average 69.1% model accuracy for the five test cases. Lastly, this work
includes a case study with FDIAs, finding that reconstructions of small portions of the power flow
model is sufficient for performing these attacks with 75% success rate, and also that the camouflage
prevents 93% of them in all but the 9-bus case.
Motor vehicles are widely used in modern society, representing one of the most significant
advancements in humans’ means of travel and enabling great economic growth. As such, they
are quite valuable and can easily become the target of theft. Traditional ways of dealing with car
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thefts generally consist of preventive and reactive strategies. Preventive methods include car alarms,
proximity control, and physical locking devices. These methods are able to prevent unauthorized
access to a vehicle, but they can be bypassed if the car is left unlocked, or if the car keys are obtained
by the thief. Reactive strategies like cameras, motion detectors, and GPS tracking can monitor a
vehicle or other item of interest, but cannot directly detect car thefts. A gap then arises between
when preventative measures are overcome by a thief and when reactive measures are consulted
after the theft is identified. The second work in this dissertation proposes a fast automatic driver
recognition system that identifies unauthorized drivers while overcoming the drawbacks of previous
approaches. Drivers’ trips are factored into elemental driving events, from which the system can
extract their driving preference features, which cannot be exactly reproduced by a thief driving
away in the stolen car. A real world evaluation using driving data collected from 31 volunteers
shows that the proposed system can successfully distinguish that the current driver is the car
owner, with 97% accuracy, while also preventing impersonation 91% of the time.
At the top layer of the aforementioned taxonomy, accurate representation and transmission
of data is integral to ensuring systems are implemented and function correctly. The third ef-
fort in this dissertation presents a new class of content masking attacks against the Adobe PDF
standard, causing documents to appear to humans dissimilar to the underlying content extracted
by information-based services. This work discovers three attack variants with notable impact on
real-world systems. The first attack allows academic paper writers and reviewers to collude via
subverting the automatic reviewer assignment systems in current use by academic conferences in-
cluding INFOCOM, which was simulated for this effort. This attack is tested with 100 test papers
and a corpus of 2094 training papers from 114 reviewers of a recent premier security conference,
finding that the attack functions using just 3-5 custom content masking fonts for almost all of
the papers tested, easily lost in any paper’s natural collection of fonts. A second attack renders
ineffective plagiarism detection software, particularly Turnitin, with a test of 10 papers proving
the attack able to target specific small plagiarism similarity scores to appear natural and evade
detection. The final attack successfully places masked content into the indexes for Bing, Yahoo!,
and DuckDuckGo which renders as information entirely different from the keywords used to locate
it, enabling spam, profane, or possibly illegal content to go unnoticed by these search engines but
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still be returned in unrelated search results. Lastly, some options for protections against these
attacks are offered.
This dissertation finally includes some future work currently in progress, which also targets the
top layer, specifically the content sharing service YouTube. Because of YouTube’s monetization
options, unethical individuals have an incentive to post and profit off of content not created by
them, such as by reposting popular songs. Consequently, YouTube has developed the Content ID
system to detect stolen audio and video by comparing new upload requests against a database of
content submitted by rightful owners. While some video can currently escape detection through the
use of minor adjustments, stolen audio appears to be more easily discovered. However, there may
yet be methods of fooling the Content ID system in order for an attacker to monetize copyrighted
audio without deleterious alteration. The preliminary efforts described in this dissertation include
a working proof of concept to automatically alter a song such that audio fingerprinting fails to
identify it, though its sound quality is presently degraded too noticeably to be an effective attack.
1.1 Dissertation Roadmap
The aforementioned projects are contained in the following chapters. Chapter 2 describes the
exploit and protection of power flow models in electric power grids. The behavioral biometric
solution to detection of auto theft is presented in Chapter 3. Then, Chapter 4 details the attack
against the content integrity of the PDF file format. Preliminary future work investigating the
robustness of YouTube’s ContentID system for audio intellectual property protection appears in
Chapter 5, followed by the Conclusion in Chapter 6. The text for Chapters 2, 3, and 4 is taken
from their respective publications, [2], [3], and [4] respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
ELECTRIC GRID POWER FLOW MODEL CAMOUFLAGE AGAINST
TOPOLOGY LEAKING ATTACKS1
2.1 Introduction
Fundamental to the productivity and stability of a developed nation is its electrical power grid,
which is responsible for delivering generated power over great distances to individuals, businesses,
and services, thereby maintaining modern life. The cascading outages that in 2003 affected some 50
million people in the northeastern US into Canada are now a few years past, but physical and cyber-
attacks against the power grid occur on the order of every four days in the US [5], making a robust
defense highly imperative. In a publicized 2013 attack, gunmen caused $15 million in damage to a
northern California substation and were not caught. Such physical attacks are necessarily localized,
while indeed cyber-attacks have no such constraint and consequently far higher potential impact.
A strong defense in this realm is thus of the highest priority.
We recognize herein that a class exists of cyber-attacks which target the grid from a knowledge
of its power flow model, which we call model-specific attacks. Within power system monitoring, the
state estimation process uses this power flow model to provide the control center an approximate
understanding of the power flow throughout the grid and thereby a means to make corrections
and preserve stability [6]. The first model-specific attacks discovered are the well-researched false
data injection attacks against state estimation [1]. In false data injection attacks, an adversary
with knowledge of the power flow model can corrupt the accuracy of state estimation by injecting
false errors into select power meters, without these errors being detected [1]. Additionally, as the
power flow model contains the topology (i.e. the interconnection network) of the power grid [7],
we identify and evaluate an additional model-specific attack in the form of grid topology leakage,
which is a compromise of proprietary information and a potential security risk.
1This chapter was published in IEEE INFOCOM 2017 [2]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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Beyond topology leakage and false data injection attacks, the sensitive nature of the information
within the power flow model indicates a potential for additional model-specific attacks with various
targets and impacts. Rather than defending against each of these other attacks as they arise, a
more proactive research approach will develop a thorough protection of the model. In so doing,
power grid administrators will suppress access to the model, but it is important to identify any
other means of discovering or deriving it. This research finds that an attacker may reconstruct
the model in Direct Current (DC) systems using information from the state estimation process.
This information may be intercepted during communications between the grid administrators and
reporting or distribution centers, for example, while the model itself would not need to be present in
such communications. This side channel attack is likely unanticipated by grid administrators and
places a lighter data-collection requirement on the attacker than to directly acquire the sensitive
power flow model. Furthermore, we also explain how an attacker can use incomplete data to recover
portions of the model. This may be all that is necessary for some model-specific attacks; indeed,
in performing a case study we find that a small partial model is sufficient for successful false data
injection attacks with high probability.
Central to this reverse engineering attack is the realization that the power flow model is de-
scribed by a sparse matrix, which allows a reasonable starting approximation even from noisy data
where an exact reproduction using traditional algebraic methods fails entirely. However, this ap-
proximation is quite crude, so we have developed novel post-processing techniques such that the
attacker may uncover substantially more accurate information, using knowledge of the data ar-
rangement methodology fundamental to all DC power flow models. For example, the symmetry of
this matrix and the guaranteed zero-sum nature of each row/column provide a powerful knowledge
base supporting the attacker in this refinement process.
The power flow model structure also yields an interesting protection scheme. The integrity
and availability of the power grid being again of the utmost importance, an adversary attempting
this attack should not merely be prevented from doing so, but also should be identified as having
tried. As the attack requires only passive eavesdropping, this discovery is difficult unless the
attacker believes the attack successful and so carries on to use the model in some way. Therefore,
we construct a structurally accurate fake power flow model which we use to camouflage the real
model during any transmission of state estimation data such that an attacker performing this
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reconstruction method will derive the fake model instead of the real. The attacker is inspired
to believe the derivation successful, while any subsequent topology or model-specific attacks will
necessarily fail due to their incorrect basis. However, the failed attacks can alert grid administrators
to the threat, such that proper defensive measures can be taken and law enforcement can be notified.
In the following research, we find that an attacker may uncover large portions of the DC power
flow model, and show how this can be used in the novel model-specific attack of grid topology
leakage. Additionally, we perform a brief case study finding that the other currently existing
model-specific attack, the false data injection attack, is feasible using the reverse engineered power
flow model. We then exhibit a means to camouflage the power flow model such that an attacker
will not successfully discover it but instead a fake version. We test these developments using a
MATLAB power flow analysis tool suite called MATPOWER, finding that an attacker can accu-
rately derive a large portion of the unprotected power flow model in each of the IEEE 9, 14, 30,
118, and 300-bus test cases included therein. Specifically, an attacker may successfully recover the
model with an average 69.1% accuracy for the systems represented in these test cases, allowing for
unauthorized discovery of 67.0% of their topology after using the model for topology leakage. Un-
der camouflage, however, the full model derivation attack is reduced to an average 10.1% accuracy.
Without camouflage, the derived models prove sufficient to successfully launch false data injection
attacks with 75% probability. While the camouflage proves unsuitable for preventing false data
injection attacks in the 9-bus system, it does however prevent 93% of them in the other systems.
The rest of this work begins with a discussion of the relevant background information. Section
2.3 details the power flow model derivation process, including the initial reconstruction and post-
processing efforts. The camouflage defense mechanism is then described in Section 2.4. Section 3.7
presents an Evaluation of the full and partial model derivation efficacy followed by that of the full
model under camouflage. The case study in Section 2.6 shows the high probability of successful
false data injection attacks building on a derived model from an uncamouflaged system and the
high probability of their failure on a camouflaged system. Finally, related work appears in Section
2.7, followed by our Conclusion.
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2.2 Background Information
Not only is uninterrupted power conveyance mandatory to grid stability, but so also is the
quality of this power, requiring minimal fluctuation in voltage magnitude and frequency to prevent
malfunction of connected electronics. System monitoring is the process of managing information
collected by meters in pertinent locations within the grid and stored in a Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) telemetry system. These measurements may include bus voltages,
power injections, and power flows in the various subsystems of a power grid, and the control center
uses these to understand the system context, or state. In particular, state estimation is that part
of system monitoring in which an approximation of the current state is derived from these meter
measurements and a known power flow model, resulting in a series of state variables. These are
used as input to contingency analysis, which as need be modifies the use of components within the
power grid to preserve its proper function despite possible equipment failures [6].
In DC state estimation, the state variables and meter measurements are related through a linear
regression model as
z = Hx + e. (2.1)
AC state estimation entails a nonlinear relation between these values and so is often approximated
by DC state estimation for analysis purposes. Additionally, for long distance bulk power transmis-
sion, DC power is used over high-voltage, direct current (HVDC) systems [8]. We therefore focus
on the DC state estimation environment for this research, noting that, since DC state estimation
is fundamental to AC state estimation, the attack and defense we explore here can serve as a basis
to extend to the AC model. In Equation 2.1, z is the vector of meter measurements of length m,
e is the length m vector of errors for each meter, x is the vector of state variables of length n, and
H is the power flow model, in the form of an m× n full rank matrix [6].
This information has two direct implications, that the power flow model H may be used to cause
harm, and that it may be derived from other information in the absence of its own availability.
False data injection attacks, introduced previously as an example of model-specific attacks, follow
the first implication, and build an attack vector as a linear combination of the columns of H, which
is added to z in the form of injections at each applicable meter. These injections do not cause
an increase in the residual error measured in the process of bad data detection, but they cause
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the estimated state variables x to deviate from their correct values which could destabilize the
system monitoring process [1]. This research considers the second implication, the possibility of
determining H from z and x, given that as a result of research in false data injection attacks, H is
now considered sensitive information.
Specifically, for study of the DC power flow, the state variables x are the voltage angles θ of
length n, and the measurements z are the net injections P measured at each of the n buses in the
power system. They are related by the power flow model H, which for DC is the nodal admittance
matrix Y describing the electrical admittance over any branches between buses [9]. Y is of size
n×n to hold data for possible branches between each of the n buses and every other, except itself;
the diagonal elements of Y are called self-admittances and describe the total admittance ending at
that bus, to satisfy Kirchhoff’s circuit laws. In all, each element of Y is given by
Yij =

yii +
∑
k 6=i yik j = i
−yij j 6= i
where yij is the admittance between buses i and j, and yii is the admittance to ground at bus i,
typically treated as zero [10].
Aside from this introduction of their physical meaning, this work will refer to these values in
their general terms of H, x, and z. With this construction, each branch admittance appears twice
(Yij and Yji, i 6= j), so H = Y is necessarily symmetric. The diagonal elements are always positive,
and the off-diagonal elements are all negative. Finally, because each bus’ self-admittance (diagonal
element) is the sum of all admittances for branches connected to that bus (off-diagonal elements in
that row/column), each row/column sums to zero. These properties will aid in the reconstruction
process through post-processing steps we designed to enforce them upon the initial estimation.
2.3 Power Flow Model Derivation Attack Process
Recovery of the power flow model may be performed by the adversary as two major components,
with the second refining the results of the initial calculation. Additionally, this section describes
this process for deriving a partial model using incomplete data.
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2.3.1 Initial Reconstruction
As already introduced, we derive the power flow model for DC systems using pairs of meter
measurements and corresponding state variables. A ready formulation appends n sets of measure-
ments together as columns of an m×n matrix Z (with corresponding m×n matrix of measurement
errors E) and likewise n sets of state variables as an n× n matrix X. The relation
Z = HX + E (2.2)
now holds, but the error E is irrecoverable from the measurements Z. As this error, normally
assumed to be white Gaussian noise, is suffered by all measurements uniquely, Equation 2.2 is
better described as
ZE = HX (2.3)
with ZE and X known by the attacker. This becomes a matrix recovery problem, for which we
identify two possible solutions, which follow.
2.3.1.1 Traditional Algebraic Solution
Working from Equation 2.3, a simple algebraic rearrangement should theoretically yield an easy
reconstruction of H:
ZE = HX
ZEX
−1 = HXX−1
H = ZEX
−1
However, due to the random error hidden in ZE , a simple right multiplication of X
−1 in Equation
2.3 returns an inaccurate result for H. We illustrate this in Section 2.5.2, finding that it is difficult
even through post-processing to cause the reconstruction to have the properties of DC power flow
models listed in Section 2.2. In contrast, the second solution obtains better results, so we focus on
it and show it to be useful for an attacker in further evaluation.
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2.3.1.2 Row-wise Sparse Vector Reconstruction
With the inaccurate result of the traditional algebraic method, the attacker’s challenge is to
find another way to solve for H. The sparsity of H is now relevant, as it enables an approximation
via compressive sensing, despite the error in ZE .
Compressive sensing [11] is the process of recovering sparse signals using a dictionary, or sensing
matrix, enabling much more expedient conveyance than that required by the Shannon/Nyquist
sampling theorem. Considering the dictionary A and sparse signal x generating b by relation
Ax = b, b may be sent instead of x, requiring less sampling [11]. This is made possible by the
fact that minimizing the L1-norm (through basis pursuit, for example) in reconstruction of x from
b and A results in the sparsest solution with high probability [12].
Building from this technique, we show the derivation of H row by row, in the presence of the
aforementioned error. Equation 2.3 implies
zi = hiX
where zi and hi are the i-th rows of ZE and H, respectively. The transpose property ensures
zTi = X
ThTi
which is of the form Ax = b indicating the sparse row hi may be solved as in compressive sensing,
with XT as the dictionary. Accordingly, each row of H is estimated through basis pursuit [13],
which minimizes the L1-norm, and recompiled into an overall approximation Hˆ. Hence, this may
be referred to as a row-wise sparse vector reconstruction (RSVR).
The recovered approximation via RSVR is more resilient to error than the direct algebraic
calculation, naturally, as it is an approximation, but both can benefit from some considerable
refinement to converge more closely to the original. As visible in Tables 2.1, 2.3, and 2.2 in our
Evaluation, the initial reconstruction is highly inaccurate and will be unsuitable for use in any
further attacks. It is, however, a good starting point, and the following section details a series of
methods we have developed for refinement.
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2.3.2 Post-Processing
We detail here a four-step process for augmenting the initial reconstruction, both via the tra-
ditional algebraic solution and the RSVR, based on the properties of the DC power flow model
detailed in the background information in Section 2.2 and summarized here:
1. H is symmetrical
2. Diagonal entries are always positive
3. Off-diagonal non-zero entries are all negative
4. Each row (and column) sums to zero
The second property always holds immediately, due to the strength (high magnitude) of these values
relative to the rest in each vector; the rest do not. In the four steps below, we outline methods to
ensure they do, while converging toward a better accuracy than the initial reconstruction Hˆ. The
first and second steps run in parallel, having different strengths, and their results are merged in
the third step. Thresholds appear in the first and second steps, and they are optimized in Section
2.5.3.
2.3.2.1 Item-specific Symmetry Enforcement
This step addresses the first and third properties above, from a focus on each pair of entries
across the diagonal. It begins with a simple threshold that zeros out off-diagonal values of Hˆ above
a small negative threshold t1. This immediately satisfies Property 3. Also, while basis pursuit finds
the sparsest solution for each hi in z
T
i = X
ThTi , in presence of error in ZE this results in most
values in the estimated hˆi being near (but not equal) to and necessarily changed to zero, which
this threshold achieves. Next, for symmetry across the diagonal (Property 1), entries that are zero
on one side of the diagonal of Hˆ are zeroed out on the other side if necessary, while entries that are
non-zero on both sides of the diagonal are averaged. The results of this step are called Hˆ1. This
step has a weakness in the form of non-zero entries which are removed by the threshold for being
smaller than the noise to which the initial threshold is calibrated, so the following parallel step is
designed to recover these.
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Figure 2.1: A sample IEEE 118-bus model reconstruction undergoing post-processing Step 2 on
column/row 30.
2.3.2.2 Full Row/Column Symmetry Enforcement
Also building from the initial reconstruction, this step exploits the necessary symmetry between
the full i-th row and i-th column, where the previous treated only the symmetry of each entry across
the diagonal. We observe that actual non-zero elements of H often appear as local minima in both
the i-th row and i-th column of Hˆ, while actual zero elements may appear as a minima in the
row, but not the column, for example. This observation is again due to their relative strength in
the compressive sensing reconstruction process (visible in Figure 2.1) and enables a noise-agnostic
recovery of those non-zero elements of H which are closer to zero than the average noise in Hˆ.
To visualize, the red and green dotted lines in Figure 2.1 are the initial reconstruction of the 30th
column and row, respectively, while the blue line with four negative peaks shows the four actual
non-zero off-diagonal entries of H for that column/row. Note the wildly dissimilar nature of the row
and column plotted together, except at the four points where non-zero off-diagonal values should
appear.
Therefore, for each row and column pair, positive values in the initial reconstruction are set
to zero for sake of Property 3, after which any matching local minima are identified as the non-
zero elements of that pair. ”Matching” local minima are defined as those which are within some
percentage (threshold t2) of each other. These are averaged, as in Step 1, to induce Property 1.
Due to the possibility of adjacent non-zero entries, one of which would necessarily not appear as a
local minima due to the other, this process is repeated, with identified non-zero entries temporarily
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raised to zero, until no new matching minima are found. Finally, of the potential non-zero values
found, those are kept whose entries on the row and column are sufficiently close in magnitude to
each other. The results are named Hˆ2.
2.3.2.3 Merging Previous Results
As mentioned, Hˆ1 has a dearth of the near-zero values which Step 1 cannot discern from noise,
some of which may appear in Hˆ2. Also, while the requirement in Step 2 that derived non-zero
values are close in magnitude between their row and column reconstructions is necessary to remove
many false positives, it also removes some true non-zero values in Hˆ2, which Hˆ1 may contain.
Consequently, we rewrite Hˆ as Hˆ1 and Hˆ2 merged in a simple union. This is realized as any zero
elements of Hˆ1 which are non-zero in Hˆ2 being replaced with the corresponding non-zero values
from Hˆ2. As any non-zero entries appearing in both Hˆ1 and Hˆ2 will necessarily be of the same
magnitude, having been derived in the same manner (averaging over the diagonal), this has the
same result as if Hˆ1 and Hˆ2 are reversed.
2.3.2.4 Row/Column Summation Enforcement
Having now ensured the symmetry of Hˆ and the negativity of its off-diagonal elements, Property
4 must next be satisfied, which requires each row and column to sum to zero. Step 4 iterates over
the columns of Hˆ, finding for each the subset (of any cardinality) of non-zero off-diagonal elements
which most closely sums in magnitude to the diagonal entry, such that the entire column sum
is nearest zero. Elements outside of this subset are subsequently set to zero, in the column and
also the corresponding transposed row to preserve Property 1. Obviously, this means that some
elements of columns yet to be processed are decided by the results of previous columns, namely,
those elements above the diagonal, which reflect over the diagonal to columns already processed.
Each subsequent column hence contains a ”safe set” consisting of its elements above the diagonal,
which may not be zeroed. Figure 2.2 illustrates this during the processing of the sixth column
(shaded), where the results of previous columns have determined two values above the diagonal.
(An ‘x’ marks each non-zero entry already determined to be part of Hˆ.) The subset is then found,
of entries below the diagonal, which sum (together with the safe set) most closely to the magnitude
of the diagonal element.
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Figure 2.2: A fictional IEEE 14-bus model reconstruction undergoing post-processing Step 4 on
column 6.
The output of these four post-processing steps is an Hˆ forced to satisfy the structure of the
power flow model. Having no other assumptions regarding the values within the model, this is the
only possible method for increasing the accuracy of the initial estimation. Section 2.5.3 details the
accuracy gains from post-processing, but briefly the number of correctly identified zero/non-zero
entries increases by an average of 47.8% additively for the five IEEE test cases, and the magnitudes
of the entries become 44.1% more accurate.
2.3.3 Partial Model Derivation
Some attacks making use of the power flow model may not require the full model, and with
some extension the RSVR method can reconstruct robust partial models using only a portion of
the existing meters and only a portion of the desired number of measurement/state variable pairs
specified in Section 2.3.1. This imposes a still smaller requirement on the attacker while our case
study (Section 2.6) illustrates the utility of the partial model in false data injection attacks, finding
that just a small portion of the model is sufficient to perform these attacks successfully with high
probability.
With incomplete information, the model derivation process differs slightly. From Equation 2.3,
again, we derive Hˆ row by row, using zi = hiX, where zi and hi are the i-th rows of Z and H,
respectively. We estimate hi as before, but in the case of access only to a subset of power meters
and corresponding state variables, we can determine each row i only if i is the index of a meter
and state variable which is known. For example, if only meters and state variables 1 through 35 of
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a 118 bus system are available, we can only recreate rows 1 through 35 of H. Similarly, we prefer
as before n sets of meter measurements and state variables, but if n − k sets are available, the
estimation of hi can still take place. The result will simply differ in that hi will only have n − k
entries which are presumably accurate, with the rest assigned zero.
In this manner, using some portion m1 of m meter measurements/state variables and some
portion n1 of n sets of these, the same overall methodology presented in Section 2.3.1 results in Hˆ
′
of size m1 × n1. This is padded with zeros to form a correctly dimensioned Hˆ, but the non-zero
values of H dimensionally outside of Hˆ
′
are not recoverable. Due to this fact, Step 4 of the post
processing method presented in Section 2.3.2 cannot be performed as it will generate incorrect
results if actual non-zero values of H appear outside of the recoverable Hˆ
′
. The others remain
applicable however, and able to improve the accuracy of Hˆ.
2.4 Power Flow Model Camouflage
Prevention against power flow model leakage will require protection of state variables and meter
measurements wherever they appear. Communications from grid administrators to logging or
reporting centers may as previously mentioned include this information in its aggregate (which may
be misused for this attack) for records of past performance or review in case of later unexpected
situations. The aggregate information is consequently the subject of our protection efforts, but an
attacker’s ability should not be ignored to compile the ingredients we have specified for deriving the
full model or just a small portion. For example, meter measurements need not be retrieved from
some repository if they can be instead viewed at the physical meters. In addition, power companies
have traditionally been loath to provide encryption at these endpoints due to the necessary addition
of specialized hardware and software encryption solutions. This reluctance may fade with the
continued development of the smart grid, but the DC systems addressed by this work are the larger
backbone to the substations supplying the end user, and will consequently require some other
mitigation technique for some time. For this reason, the ability to protect meter measurements
through encryption should not be assumed.
In contrast, for transmission between components of the grid administration, the compiled meter
measurements and state variables may be encrypted, as the endpoints of these communications can
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be presumed to have the necessary hardware and software. Simply encrypting the data will protect
it but will offer no ability to detect that an attacker is making the effort to eavesdrop. The sensitive
environment of power systems security would benefit from that knowledge, however, as attackers
of the power grid are most likely of the class supported by governments. Where a casual attacker
would easily yield to failure, such a motivated attacker will have the resources necessary to exhaust
this attack space and proceed to another. To take effective steps to defeating this class of attacker
is only possible through their identification and incarceration.
We accordingly offer an opportunity to identify and prevent the attack before the attacker
proceeds to another attack space, by providing a false indication of success. We reason that if an
attacker is able to derive a fake power flow model Hˆf having all the correct characteristics, an
attack based thereupon will both fail and alert the grid administrators. In the case of FDIAs, the
attack vector will not pass bad data detection, and existing methods for discovering faulty meters
will in so doing physically locate the attacker (who must physically compromise the applicable
meters [1]).
An attacker using our power flow model derivation technique will need pairs of meter measure-
ments and state variables, but these should be altered in some way so as to lead to the solution of
Hf instead of H. However, the legitimate administrative duties involving the sending and receiving
of real meter measurements and state variables should persist under this camouflage, so the data
sent should contain the real Z and X, irretrievable to attackers but not to authorized personnel.
This may be achieved by creating for the attacker to find an Hf equal to H multiplied with some
matrix F, effectively camouflaging H for all those who do not know F. This F will also be used
to encode/decode Z and/or X, depending on how F is multiplied with H. Multiple options exist,
encoding Z, X, or both, but it is best to leave the meter measurements Z untouched. Because, as
previously stated, encryption of power meters is not an immediate possibility, it should be assumed
the attacker can view the measurements at the physical meter locations. If these values do not
match the data retrieved by the attacker from administrative communications, the camouflage will
be obvious, and the attacker will move to a different attack vector.
Accordingly, we inject F into the original Z = HX (Equation 2.3) as follows:
Z = (HF)F−1X. (2.4)
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In Equation 2.4, Hf = HF will be the modified form of H which the attacker will derive instead
of the true H, using the unchanged Z and the modified Xf = F
−1X. Without knowing F, it will
be impossible to discern the real H, but with F as a pre-shared secret among authorized parties,
the original meter measurements and state variables will be retrievable. We find that it takes a
very specific yet not generalizable F to form Hf with the correct properties of the DC power flow
model, so we obtain F from a pre-contrived Hf and the real H as
F = H−1Hf .
Creating this fake power flow model Hf is as simple as constructing a sparse matrix satisfying
the properties of a real model as enumerated in Section 2.3.2. A convincing fake will also have
non-zero values in the same distribution as the real non-zero values, but in different locations; we
give a sample method of constructing a realistic Hf in Section 2.5.5 where we evaluate its ability
to disrupt the derivation process.
Ultimately, by encoding X as above and leaving Z as is, the attacker may solve
Z = HfXf
and discover the fake power flow model Hf , which will be unsuitable for topology or model-based
attacks. We verify the effects of model camouflage in Section 2.5.5 and in our case study on FDIAs
in Section 2.6.
2.5 Evaluation
2.5.1 Setup
We assess our derivation of the power flow model on five IEEE test cases provided in a collection
of MATLAB code entitled MATPOWER. MATPOWER simulates power flow calculations in AC
and, in our case, DC systems, and provides sample data for power systems including 9, 14, 30, 118,
and 300-bus cases, which we examine in our evaluation. However, this case data only comprises the
system in one state, while we require pairs of meter measurements and state variables to form our
matrices Z and X. Also, MATPOWER does not perform state estimation, due to no simulation
of meter measurements and their errors, but rather calculates the state variables (voltage angles)
directly as part of the power flow analysis.
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Table 2.1: Power system topology reconstruction accuracy using the traditional algebraic method:
valid connections found (M1) and wrongly identified connections (M2, parenthetical).
Case No Post-Processing Step 1 only Step 2 only Step 3 Step 4
9 86.8% (41.0%) 69.3% (7.1%) 65.3% (6.1%) 70.0% (7.4%) 67.8% (5.3%)
14 83.0% (39.9%) 61.8% (8.1%) 54.9% (5.2%) 61.8% (8.1%) 56.9% (4.9%)
30 82.9% (38.7%) 41.2% (3.0%) 36.2% (1.0%) 41.2% (3.0%) 49.6% (2.5%)
118 81.5% (44.4%) 53.8% (6.0%) 25.3% (0.0%) 53.8% (6.0%) 41.5% (1.4%)
300 76.9% (42.7%) 55.8% (7.1%) 26.9% (0.0%) 55.8% (7.1%) 35.4% (0.8%)
To create the collection of state variable sets X, we perturb each of the calculated state variables
to form n slightly different copies, by adding to each variable random Gaussian noise of magnitude
based on a specified noise level (0.1) and the original variable value. This formulation corresponds
to the case where the power grid state does not fluctuate wildly for some time, that is, when
generation and load are fairly constant throughout the grid. This scenario is commonplace during
night hours when most people are sleeping or weekday morning hours when most are working, for
example. We then create the collection of n measurement sets Z by the equation Z = HX. Now,
Hˆ may be calculated directly from Z and X, which is not possible in practice, so we add noise to
each entry of Z to simulate measurement error, using random Gaussian noise as done for X.
To simulate systems under different supply and demand scenarios is prudent for a thorough
understanding of the applicability of this attack in different environments, so we also construct new
case data for each of the five aforementioned system sizes. Here, we alter the generation capacity
for the generators in the system, as well as the branch admittances and loads. Practically, this
is done by filling out the MATPOWER case structure with values reproducing the distribution of
values in the provided test cases. These are held within the necessary constraints, such as power
drawn from a generator being limited to the range supported by that generator. Unique power flow
analyses may then be performed on these constructed cases, so they provide different power flow
models to test the derivation process upon.
A variety of approaches could be taken to optimize the thresholds used in post-processing the
results of the initial reconstruction. We focus on the topology accuracy and calculate a confusion
matrix, minimizing the sum of the false positives (identified connections which do not exist) and false
negatives (actual connections undiscovered) to optimize. We note that depending on an attacker’s
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Table 2.2: Power system topology reconstruction accuracy using the RSVR method: valid connec-
tions found (M1) and wrongly identified connections (M2, parenthetical).
Case No Post-Processing Step 1 only Step 2 only Step 3 Step 4
9 89.3% (37.0%) 69.8% (4.3%) 74.5% (10.6%) 69.8% (4.3%) 70.1% (4.1%)
14 90.4% (30.1%) 76.1% (4.3%) 69.1% (7.1%) 76.1% (4.3%) 71.6% (3.2%)
30 91.1% (27.0%) 71.0% (1.7%) 60.2% (2.7%) 71.0% (1.7%) 70.0% (1.3%)
118 93.2% (32.0%) 66.0% (0.37%) 34.4% (0.29%) 66.0% (0.37%) 65.4% (0.28%)
300 86.9% (5.3%) 64.5% (0.04%) 26.9% (0.0%) 64.5% (0.04%) 58.0% (0.02%)
Table 2.3: Power flow model reconstruction accuracy using the RSVR method: similarity of H and
Hˆ (M3).
Case No Post-Processing Step 1 only Step 2 only Step 3 Step 4
9 37.2% 49.5% 49.0% 49.5% 49.9%
14 39.0% 62.1% 61.6% 62.1% 62.1%
30 27.6% 68.5% 65.0% 68.5% 69.1%
118 0.0% 70.7% 52.3% 70.7% 71.9%
300 58.0% 91.8% 87.3% 91.8% 92.4%
goals one or the other type of error could be given precedence. To present resultant accuracies,
we employ three metrics, the first two describing topology accuracy, and the third representing the
overall accuracy of the reconstructed power flow model.
The proper identification of which elements of Hˆ are non-zero is sufficient for an accurate
knowledge of the topology of the power flow model, as this specifies the interconnection network
between buses. However, merely representing the accuracy of the topology reconstruction as the
percentage of elements in Hˆ correctly classified as zero or non-zero skews toward a higher percentage
than would be statistically useful due to the sparsity of H and the consequent “high accuracy” that
would be obtained by simply filling out an Hˆ with all zero off-diagonal elements. Consequently we
work again from the confusion matrix; the first metric M1 is the percentage of valid connections
found, and the second metric M2 is the percentage of unconnected buses incorrectly derived as
connected (or “false connections”):
M1 =
TP
TP + FN
,M2 =
FP
FP + TN
Finally, an accurate knowledge of the power flow model in its entirety relies upon the non-zero
values having the right magnitude, such that they correctly describe the impedance on each branch.
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Figure 2.3: Threshold optimization for each of the four post-processing steps in the IEEE 30-bus
test case.
Accordingly, the third metric M3 is defined as the total difference between Hˆ and H, standardized
as a percentage of the total magnitude of H, and subtracted from 1 to indicate similarity. That is,
M3 = 1−
∑
i,j |Hˆij −Hij |∑
i,j |Hij |
This is partially dependent upon the quality of the topology reconstruction, as correctly identifying
which entries have zero or non-zero values will result in a greater M3. Other metrics than M3
may measure the similarity between Hˆ and H, such as the average percentage of the entries of
Hˆ respective to their entries in H, but most elements of Hˆ and H are zero. Assigning correct
zero values an accuracy of 100% would skew the model accuracy upward and away from what the
metric is supposed to measure. M3 as described best captures what difference there is between the
non-zero values in Hˆ and H. In all figures and tables present in this Evaluation, Topology accuracy
refers to a maximal M1 and minimal M2, and Full Model accuracy refers to a maximal M3.
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2.5.2 Row-wise Sparse Vector Reconstruction Vs. Algebraic Derivation
We here demonstrate the inefficacy of the traditional algebraic derivation method for calculat-
ing H and compare these results with the row-wise sparse vector reconstruction (RSVR) method
developed in this research. For each of our five test case sizes, 9, 14, 30, 118, and 300, we generate
ten power flow models in the manner described in our Evaluation Setup (Section 2.5.1). We then
generate paired measurements and state variables matrices Z and X ten times for each model.
Using these 100 Z and X pairs, we test our post-processing methods one at a time and vary the
two thresholds involved, to verify the methods work to refine the results and find the thresholds
which best achieve this. For comparison, we present the accuracy obtained by the bare recon-
struction process with only a small threshold applied to take near-zero values to zero. Without
this threshold, false positives (non-zeros, or hypothesized connections, which are not there) will
be nearly 100%, so we consider this to be ”no post-processing” in our reported numbers for more
informative comparison. From there we test the post-processing steps as follows:
• Step 1 only
• Step 2 only
• Steps 1 and 2 combined (Step 3)
• Full post-processing (Steps 1-4)
Steps 1 and 2 each have one threshold to optimize, so in performing these tests we optimize
whichever one or both are applicable. We illustrate in Section 2.5.3 and Figure 2.3 this process
for the IEEE 30-bus case, but report all results here in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. Comparing the
first two, which summarize topology reconstruction accuracy, the RSVR method very obviously
increases the number of valid connections found and decreases the number of wrongly identified
connections in every case. It is clear that in both cases the post-processing methods work well to
eliminate most wrongly identified connections and increase the attacker’s certainty of the validity
of identified connections. However, starting from the initial reconstruction, the RSVR method is
simply better, and this translates throughout all post-processing. In fact, the traditional algebraic
method has so many wrongly identified connections that by our similarity score M3, the overall
model reconstruction accuracy actually dives to zero for the larger systems. Those results are so
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poor we do not report them, and rather focus on the RSVR method only in discussing the overall
model accuracy.
2.5.3 Model Derivation Accuracy Optimization
This section illustrates the optimization process used to find the results reported in Tables 2.1,
2.2, and 2.3. We discuss the 30-bus case specifically but the concepts apply to each system. Without
the help of post-processing, 91.1% of valid connections are found for the 30-bus case. While this is
a high percentage, 27.0% of unconnected pairs of buses are falsely identified as connected, and the
overall model accuracy is only 27.6%. For reference, the sparsity of the IEEE 30-bus case is roughly
88%, so a 27.0% false positive rate results in around 213 invalid hypothesized connections, which
is far more than the 112 valid connections. Clearly, minimizing the false positive rate is of high
importance, and the post-processing steps address this. Threshold optimization for post-processing
Step 1, as shown in Figure 2.3a, finds the lowest error sum with threshold t1 = 3, resulting in
71% of valid connections found and a much-reduced 1.7% of non-connections assumed connected.
The optimization for Step 2 is performed similarly to Step 1, with a threshold t2 = 0.7 resulting
in the lowest error, as illustrated in Figure 2.3b. Figures 2.3c and 2.3d show the optimization
of both thresholds for Step 3 and Step 4, with the heat maps representing the same threshold
optimization process but in two dimensions for the two applicable thresholds. Ultimately, with
thresholds t1 = 2.75 and t2 = 1.0, the lowest cumulative error is found for Step 4, with 70% of valid
connections found and only 1.3% of non-connections mis-attributed.
Examination of the overall achieved accuracies yields a possibly unintuitive discovery of the
higher overall model reconstruction accuracy found for larger systems. Table 2.3 exhibits this
trend clearly, though it may be expected that larger systems would be more difficult to reconstruct.
However, compressive sensing requires a certain degree of sparsity for an accurate reconstruction of
the data [12] as mentioned in Section 2.3.1. The smaller cases, such as the 9 or 14-bus cases, are far
less sparse than the larger cases, and so are necessarily harder to reconstruct. Additionally, while
topology reconstruction accuracy decreases slightly for the large systems, as seen in Table 2.2, it
is important to note the very small amount of wrongly identified connections for those systems.
With the sparsity of the 300 bus power flow model around 98%, this corresponds to an average
of less than five wrongly identified connections. As an attacker interested in the topology of the
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Figure 2.4: Partial reconstruction accuracy for each of the five IEEE test cases tested.
power grid would want to have high confidence in the connections identified, optimizing the two
thresholds as we have is logical, and ensures while not all of the grid topology is discovered, few
identified connections are fictitious.
2.5.4 Partial Model Derivation Accuracy
As in testing the full reconstruction accuracy, we generate ten power flow models for each
of our five test case sizes, in the manner described in the Evaluation Setup (Section 2.5.1), this
time only creating one pair of meter measurements Z and state variables X for each. Then, we
experiment with reconstructing differing submatrices of H for each of these ten power flow models.
In this experiment, all tested submatrix sizes begin at the top left entry and extend to some varied
percentage of rows and columns based on the percentage of meter measurements and state variables
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simulated as available. Consequently, in the heat maps present in Figure 2.4, each entry corresponds
to the accuracy of reconstructing the submatrix of H starting at the top left element and extending
to that entry (normalized by percentage of data used).
For example, the 9-bus case’s H matrix is 8× 8 (after one row and column is removed for the
reference bus), so the heat map entry in row 2, column 7 shows the accuracy of reconstructing
the two rows and seven columns of H starting at the top left element. The 14 and 30-bus cases
have heat maps divided into ten rows and columns, each corresponding to a 10% increment of the
meters and meter/state variable pairs. The 118 and 300-bus cases are broken up into 4% partitions
in each direction, for a fine-grained division of their larger number of buses.
In practice, the available data is unlikely to yield a submatrix always including the first element,
but it is infeasible to calculate or report the accuracy of every possible submatrix reconstruction of
H. The accuracy figures found under this constraint should be analogous to those experienced by
partitions otherwise distributed, due to the generation of multiple power flow models for each case
with different H matrix values. Additionally, the testing herein on reconstructing submatrices of all
possible sizes encounters almost all potential proportions between diagonal and off-diagonal non-
zero entries and off-diagonal zero entries. The single exception is a reconstruction of a submatrix
of H which contains only off-diagonal zero entries (such as in the bottom left or top right corners
of H), but such a submatrix of all zeros would not contain any information of use for an attacker.
There is also no reason to assume non-zero values of H cluster around the diagonal in real systems
as they do in the IEEE test cases.
The heat maps in Figure 2.4 depict accuracy measured according to the two metrics M1 and
M2, as before representing the percentage of valid topological connections found and the percentage
of unconnected buses incorrectly presumed to be connections, respectively. All post-processing is
used except for Step 4, because with incomplete rows/columns, it cannot be assumed that non-zero
values will not appear outside of the recoverable Hˆ. Consequently the thresholds t1 and t2 are set
to the values optimizing Step 3 as shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The heat maps exhibit a general
trend of more valid connections found nearing 100% of data used, where it is comparable to the
values reported in those tables for Step 3 as expected.
Viewing the heat maps for the false connections, portions of the model having disproportional
numbers of columns to rows (or the reverse) tend to have a lower rate of false connections. This is
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largely due to the greater proportion of zero to non-zero elements, causing a larger denominator for
the false connections metric M2. As visible in the corresponding valid connections heat map, M1
suffers for those more rectangular model subgraphs. Also, not pictured for space, the corresponding
full model accuracy (metric M3) is lower for these as well, however, because an imbalanced ratio of
rows to columns means there is less data for the post-processing steps to work with in refining the
actual values. As the unprocessed Hˆ is not naturally symmetric, post-processing Steps 1 and 2 are
designed to recreate the symmetry of H, but if the portion examined has more rows than columns
(or vice versa) then Step 2 will not be able to address the extra rows (or columns). This is also
why the heat maps are not symmetric while H is.
2.5.5 Derivation Accuracy under Model Camouflage
The camouflage process begins with the construction of a fake power flow model Hf , as discussed
in Section 2.4. As this needs to be a convincing fake, beyond fitting the properties of a power flow
model as enumerated in Section 2.2 it should have values of the same order as a real model, and
it should have a similar degree of sparsity. Consequently, in constructing Hf for a given test case,
we derive a list of values reproducing the distribution of off-diagonal values in H for that case,
and with these fill the strictly upper triangular portion of Hf . These values are added at random
according to a probability matching the number of off-diagonal values in H, to maintain a similar
degree of sparsity. The upper triangular portion is mirrored over the diagonal to instill symmetry,
and finally the values of each row/column are summed with the absolute value of this sum set as
the diagonal for that row/column. The resulting Hf is now a valid power flow model, but for a
system that does not exist.
As elsewhere in this evaluation, we generate ten power flow models for each of our five test
cases, each with a pair of Z and X. Then, each model is given camouflage with Hf calculated as
above. Stemming from Equation 2.4, we then generate a fake set of state variables by
Xf = F
−1X
= (H−1Hf )−1X
= H−1f HX
26
Table 2.4: System topology and power flow model reconstruction accuracy without and with the
effects of camouflage
Without Camouflage With Camouflage
Case Topology Full Model Topology Full Model
9 70.1% 49.9% 42.1% 14.4%
14 71.6% 62.1% 40.0% 16.1%
30 70.0% 69.1% 30.3% 8.1%
118 65.4% 71.9% 31.0% 11.7%
300 58.0% 92.4% 42.0% 0.0%
while Z is left as is. The model derivation process is launched for each model, using full post-
processing with the thresholds optimized in Section 2.5.3. The corresponding highly inaccurate
results are displayed in Table 2.4 in contrast to the more accurate results without camouflage.
The percentage of topology accuracy that does appear during camouflage owes essentially to the
portion of non-zero values which comprise the diagonal of every power flow model, and is therefore
unavoidable from a defense standpoint, but meaningless to the attacker. For example, in the 118-
bus system, an average of 143.4 non-zero entries of H were found, but 118 of them are the diagonal
elements and an additional average 319.6 non-zero entries were camouflaged. Furthermore, the full
model accuracy is extremely low, especially for large systems with more off-diagonal values. As
a result of this camouflage, any attempted reconstruction of the power flow model by an attacker
should not yield a successful topology or model-based attack; this claim is given credence by the
following case study showing the facilitation of FDIAs from a derived power flow model and their
subsequent prevention by applying model camouflage.
2.6 Case Study: False Data Injection Attacks on a Derived Power Flow Model
The probability of successfully carrying out FDIAs is derived in the original source material [1],
but this is again based on the assumption of having the correct power flow model. In this research,
the power flow model is calculated, and not without error, and so its suitability for a model-specific
attack such as this should be tested. Furthermore, to see the limits of what an attacker has ability
to achieve with this type of attack, we examine the efficacy of carrying out these attacks using only
a portion of the existing meters and only a portion of the desired number of measurement/state
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Table 2.5: Attack requirements and resulting average and maximum state variable alterations
Size of Hˆ Number of Meters State Variable Differences
Case Compared to H Required to Compromise Mean Maximum
9 25% 2 4.2% 14.2%
14 11.1% 2 0.5% 0.8%
30 6.25% 3 4.2% 23.5%
118 6.25% 10 0.9% 3.4%
300 6.25% 25 8.9% 498.1%
variable pairs as discussed in Section 2.3.3. We lastly illustrate the results of attempting this attack
when the model is under camouflage.
The accuracy of the estimated state variables is directly reliant upon that of the original meter
measurements, which assigns an importance to their accuracy. To reduce the impact of sporadic
large noise in measurements or their malicious alteration, bad data detection first identifies and
removes from consideration any measurements which deviate strongly from their expected values.
The calculation common to the various existent bad data detection methods is a residual error com-
parison between the vector of observed measurements and the vector of hypothetical measurements
calculated using the estimated state variables [7]. That is, after generating the estimate xˆ of state
variables x, the expected measurements are calculated as zˆ = Hxˆ and compared with the actual
measurements z. If the 2-Norm of this difference (the residual) is below a specified threshold, the
measurements are assumed correct, as are the corresponding estimated state variables. False data
injection attacks form an attack vector a as a linear combination of some columns of H, which is
added to z by corrupting the meters corresponding to non-zero elements in a. An attack vector may
be generated in the same way using Hˆ (as a padded Hˆ
′
), with one distinction. As Hˆ is merely an
estimation of H, this attack vector is not guaranteed to pass bad data detection as it is originally
[1].
With the use of only a subset of data as described in Section 2.6, the derived power flow model Hˆ
expanded from Hˆ
′
will be rather inaccurate when compared with the full H. More specifically, only
the small portion Hˆ
′
will be accurate with the matching portion of H. The important evaluation
here is rather the likelihood of successfully performing false data injection attacks using Hˆ. The
use of only a small portion of an approximation of H marks another difference between this work
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Figure 2.5: Normalized error residuals without and within the presence of false data injection
attacks using the derived power flow model Hˆ, for each IEEE test case.
and the original false data injection attack formulation. There, if an attack vector is constructed
as a linear combination of the column vectors of H, it is guaranteed to pass the bad data detection
mechanism, as the calculated residual for the compromised measurement vector will be the same
as for the unaltered [1]. Because we may be missing values outside of Hˆ
′
, and the values within Hˆ
′
may not be accurate, passing bad data detection is not likewise guaranteed.
Nevertheless, this research finds these attacks still very viable with this limited knowledge.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the residuals calculated when the system is provided unaltered meter mea-
surements (”no attack”) and those having been modified using Hˆ (”attack”), for each of the IEEE
9, 14, 30, 118, and 300-bus test cases. These have been normalized for display, as they are actu-
ally different magnitudes in practice. Readily visible is that to set a threshold during bad data
detection allowing for all of the legitimate residuals will also allow for a large majority (75%) of the
compromised measurement residuals to pass as well. That is to say, compromised measurements
cannot be distinguished from natural measurements.
Table 2.5 states the requirements on the attacker to reliably performing FDIAs, as well as the
resulting impact of these attacks on the accuracy of the state variables. These results use the
default test cases with Z and X pairs generated ten times per, static reconstruction size, and an
attack vector formed by a linear combination of the first third of available reconstructed columns,
with random weights and constructed ten times per Z and X pair. This means the average state
variable difference is an average over 100 attacks, per case, and the maximum variable difference is
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the average of each attack’s maximum effect. It can thus be stated that at least one state variable
was altered by a factor of five, on average, during 100 attacks against the 300-bus case, and that
they were all, on average, modified by 9%.
Returning to Figure 2.5, the residuals labeled ”camo” represent the residuals calculated when
the power flow model is under camouflage. Except for the 9-bus case and 28% of the 300-bus case,
these residuals are of clearly different magnitudes than those for the unaltered meter measurements.
The small size and relative lack of sparsity for the 9-bus system indicates that it may not be an
appropriate candidate for application of camouflage, but the larger systems can clearly benefit.
Indeed, 100% of attacks against 14, 30, and 118-bus systems are prevented.
2.7 Related Work
Despite extensive research into FDIAs against state estimation and their limits and impacts [14]
[15] [16] [17] (to name a few), the underlying requirement for the attacker to know the power flow
model remains largely unexplored. The potential is similarly unexplored for the power flow model,
or the grid topology contained therein, to be misused in ways other than the former with FDIAs.
Deriving the model is deemed impossible using just a collection of measurements in [18], but the
topology of the system is attained using a joint estimation of both the model H and the state
variables X, made convex using an iterative method switching between these two. Having been
tested only on the IEEE 14-bus system simulation data, and presenting the derivation accuracy
largely graphically, [18] appears technically sound but the extent to which this is accurate and
scalable is rather indeterminable. In addition to the more comprehensive test cases, up to 300-bus,
our research attempts to estimate only the power flow model H (not the state variables as well),
which is more computationally expedient, and we achieve this with reasonable accuracy as well
as the subproblem of finding the network topology with high accuracy. We also provide a strong
defense against this attack in the form of model camouflage.
In parallel publications [19] and [20], the authors perform a re-creation of the power flow model
with a very similar theme as the previously discussed related work. Understanding that local pricing
calculations are performed using the power flow model, and that these are publicly available, a
collection of prices local to every meter were used rather than their measurements. The problem
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becomes analogous (though differently solved), that is performing a joint estimation of the model
and another component used in the price estimation. In this case, the authors state the power
flow model as the output of this process, though the accuracy is similarly not discussed beyond
presenting a graphical representation, and only available for the IEEE 30-bus case. From this view
it appears the topology information (the existence of non-zero elements) is accurate, but the power
flow model information (the magnitudes of non-zero elements) is less so. We accordingly strive for
more thorough testing and concrete portrayal of results, in addition to exploring the problem from
a different angle, and as previously stated offer a protection mechanism which is lacking here.
The problem of network topology derivation on the part of the power grid administrators has
spawned slightly more work recently, for the sake of performing accurate state estimation in an
environment that changes with time. Recent trends toward distributed generation on the part of
customers adding renewable sources such as solar power to their homes cause topological changes
grid administrators need to incorporate, as state estimation is dependent upon these aspects they do
not govern. Frequency domain reflectometry is used over the power line communications channel
by [21], which has the same topology as the power grid, to determine lengths of branches and
where they separate. A similar strategy is used in [22], instead compiling end-to-end distance
measurements and working out distances of interior nodes from these. These efforts focus on
small ”micro grids” with the latter requiring considerable foreknowledge. Another work suggests
an announcement protocol to be carried out whenever a new endpoint is added to the topology,
for a decentralized approach [23]. Clearly, while related, these ideas will not facilitate a practical
derivation of the power flow model by an attacker, while as evidenced by our case study, we are
able to do so well enough to facilitate FDIAs and potentially other attacks.
2.8 Summary
This research illustrates an ability to reverse engineer a large portion of DC power flow model
to an accuracy of 69.1% (averaged across 5 IEEE system sizes), including 67.0% of its topology,
and illustrates its use in performing false data injection attacks against state estimation. We find
the residual error caused by false data injection attacks using this reconstruction is well hidden
within the inherent error, but demonstrate a novel camouflage technique able to prevent them 93%
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of the time in systems other than the 9-bus case, by reducing the inferred system model accuracy
to 10.1%.
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CHAPTER 3
VEHICLE THEFT PREVENTION USING UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER
BEHAVIOR DETECTION1
3.1 Introduction
Motor vehicles are an integral part of modern society, providing for the largest portion of
transportation enjoyed by individuals in developed countries. As such, they are also quite valuable
and the target of theft. In 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigations reported an estimated 721,053
vehicles were stolen in the United States, 73.9% of them are automobiles, costing more than $4.3
billion. Indeed, only 11.9% of motor vehicle theft was cleared that year [24]. Losing a car not
only causes property loss, but could also trigger lawsuits against the car owner. A legal case was
reported by the media in 2009 where the owner of a stolen car was sued for the deaths of two
teenagers in a fatal hit-and-run accident [25].
In dealing with car thefts, both preventative and reactive strategies have been used. Preven-
tative measures like car alarms, proximity control, and physical locking devices intend to prevent
access to a vehicle by unauthorized users. Typical preventative methods can alert passers-by or
the car owner to a break-in, prevent ignition if the owner’s key fob is not close to the vehicle, or
deter the theft by adding extra facilities like wheel locks. However, these methods can be bypassed
if circumstances or human error result in the car being left unlocked, or the car keys are obtained
by the thief. Moreover, preventative methods are entirely ineffectual once the car is stolen.
Reactive strategies monitor a vehicle or item of interest but do not interact directly in its
security. For example, camera feeds must be continuously observed by humans to detect theft,
which is impractical for private security, so they are mostly reviewed after the theft is discovered
to identify the thief. It is normally infeasible for security guards in apartment complexes, gated
communities, or college or business campuses to survey the entire grounds at once or recognize a
1This chapter was published in ACM ASIACCS 2016 [3]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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driver as having unauthorized access to one of many vehicles there. Other monitoring concepts
such as motion sensors can suffer high false alarm rates for vehicles parked outside amidst high
human traffic. Finally, GPS-based car services such as OnStar [26] or LoJack [27] may be used
to track a vehicle but again require the knowledge that it is stolen. These assorted weaknesses of
reactive strategies can result in thefts that go unnoticed for hours. For example, cars parked in
neighborhoods at night may not be identified as stolen until the next morning. Allowing the thief
control of a vehicle for a long time may significantly reduce the chance of recovering it due to an
increase in the risk of the car being involved in a crime or disassembled in chop shops.
The aforementioned approaches have the common underlying limitation of reliance on the infal-
libility of the user in handling the vehicle’s security (never leaving the car unlocked and unattended,
for example) and the timely discovery of its potential theft. If both of these dependencies are vio-
lated, these measures are completely defeated. In fact, the United States National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration reports “40-50% of vehicle theft is due to driver error” [28]. The ideal design
of a security mechanism must forgo assuming these impossibilities and instead detect and notify
the owner of the car theft as early as possible.
An intuitive way to achieve this goal is to enforce passwords in car systems, with incorrect
password inputs triggering an alert to the car owner. However, this strategy has its own drawbacks.
First, the dashboards and control panels of all existing car models are located in the front of a car.
It is therefore easy to carry out shoulder surfing attacks where passengers may purposefully or
inadvertently catch the password typed by the driver. Secondly, as indicated in [29], passwords are
susceptible to smudge attacks, wherein the attacker may put together the oil residue of recent finger
smudges left on the touch screen to infer the password. A third issue is that passwords can reduce
the system’s usability, because the car owner has to memorize a password and change it periodically
to maintain security. Then, whenever the user needs to drive the car, he has to provide a correct
password, which, because inconvenient, can motivate a user to disable the password function.
In contrast, we propose an automatic driver recognition system that does not require any
interaction between the user and the car after the initial setup. Our basic idea is to utilize driving
behavior, which cannot be precisely reproduced by a thief driving away in the stolen car. This
precludes the necessity for human discovery of theft, instead monitoring for unauthorized use
continually. We expound upon our driver classification method to explain the logistics of using
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its results to identify car theft in a secure and usable fashion. Authorization is passive, so a user
is not required to perform any additional, potentially annoying action upon car entry before every
drive. This is important due to the propensity of users to brush aside new security measures
which require additional effort. We also describe options for handling alerts and false alarms which
maximize usability and practicality within real-world constraints.
We identified two guiding principles upon which we built our system. First, we should observe
the existence of personal and quantifiable driving preferences. But more importantly, drivers have
varying amounts of control over how much of their own driving preferences they can apply to each
of the several driving events involved with any use of a car. Secondly, drivers behave differently
when traveling at different magnitudes of speed. These principles will be explained in further detail
later, as we evaluate the efficacy of potential behavioral features, which said principles inspired. We
use the resulting effective features to classify between users, testing periodically over the beginning
of each drive until a prediction is made authorizing or un-authorizing the driver. Unobservable,
efficient, and easily applied to existing vehicles, this system can identify whether or not the driver
of a car is its owner, so that the owner may be quickly alerted to a theft.
We performed real world evaluation using the driving data collected from 31 volunteers. Our
experiment results show that the proposed system is suitable for driver identification and thereby
authentication. It is capable of self-identification, that is, successfully distinguishing that the
current driver is the car owner, with 97% accuracy, while also preventing impersonation 91% of the
time. We show the effects of a varying training dataset size, finding that at minimum 25 minutes
of city driving time is necessary in training to provide desirable accuracy in driver recognition.
Likewise, the required testing time is demonstrated to be within 25 minutes of city driving.
This work has the following contributions:
1. We propose an automatic driver recognition system for the fast detection of car
thefts.
2. We identify the effective features that reflect the unique driving preferences of a
driver.
3. We propose an online testing algorithm that accepts input data as it is collected
continuously and outputs a decision quickly.
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4. We describe multiple implementation options and logistics for handling false alarms
and other security concerns.
5. We offer a sample theft notification application for one or multiple authorized users.
6. We implement the proposed system and evaluate the performance on a real-world
data set collected from 31 volunteer drivers.
3.2 Related Work
Driver authentication via behavioral biometrics is an unexplored topic, so the most closely
related work falls in the following areas.
3.2.1 Behavioral Authentication of Mobile Devices
The system proposed herein pertains to the field of behavioral biometrics, inspired by similar
concepts applied to mobile device security to identify devices as stolen before their owners notice
their absence. Integrating physiological biometric sensing technology into phones is expensive and
consumes space - both important optimization factors - without providing functionality improve-
ments the typical user would enjoy or wish to pay for, when compared with mobile GPUs enabling
more interesting video games. Furthermore, the physical tests required to pass biometric scans
can provide good accuracy while being inconvenient and potentially still spoofed. For example,
iris scans can be very accurate [30] but require good lighting and can even be spoofed by a high
quality picture [31]. Meanwhile, fingerprint scanners are popular and generally effective [32], but
the Apple iPhone 5S fingerprint scanner has proved erratic [33], leading users to turn off the feature.
Similar trade offs and problems are encountered with applying physiological biometrics to vehicles,
so behavioral biometrics employing existing sensors and new software is an attractive alternative
for both applications.
Accordingly, Shahzad et al. distinguish several features of swiping gestures on touch screens
which allowed them to differentiate between 50 individuals with high accuracy as a protocol for
unlocking devices [29]. With a similar method and similar high accuracy, but different application,
Li et al. use gesture features to continuously re-authenticate throughout usage of the device,
denying further access if the gesture behaviors change suddenly [34]. Several efforts have also been
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made in recognizing phone owners using their walking signature [35] or by their typing habits [36]
as measured by the device’s accelerometer.
3.2.2 Modeling Driving Behavior
For safety applications, recent research has explored the idea of driving behavior models, with
individual endeavors focusing on particular portions of driving habits. General human decision
making at unsigned intersections has been simulated using hidden Markov models (HMMs), to
predict vehicle movements through those intersections and any conflict involved [37]. Typical
highway driving has been modeled with probabilistic networks based on relative positions, velocities,
and accelerations of surrounding vehicles and also some environmental variables, to inform decision
making in autonomous vehicles driving in human traffic [38]. Sathyanarayana et al. illustrate
distraction detection applications to their work in drivers’ unique route recognition also using
HMMs built around traces of their typical maneuvers [39].
Behavior modeling and driver identification in particular has been achieved with a 76.8% rate
of correct driver selection [40], for the purpose of tailoring an intelligent transportation system
(ITS) to augment the user’s driving with adaptive cruise control or lane keeping, depending on
how much the user typically needs such assistance. Identification helps here to avoid annoying the
driver with too much intervention or, by too little, allowing the driver to incur danger. This is
accomplished by performing spectral analysis of Gaussian mixture models consisting of gas pedal
depression statistics [40]. This research has been built upon in expanding the application of ITSs in
vehicles, as well as work in autonomous vehicle safety, but no such driver identification schemes have
been applied to authentication and car theft detection. Moreover the system we discuss involves
additional driving features and enjoys higher accuracy.
3.3 Attack Model and Design Goals
We assume an attacker has physical access to the vehicle and the ability to start it and drive
away. This means the attacker has bypassed any car alarms and physical impediments to accessing
the vehicle and has not alerted anyone to the theft. It is then possible to relocate the car to
any location to sell, scrap, or use in a crime. Selling and scrapping are similar in that they
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Figure 3.1: Driver behavioral classification system design
typically involve anonymizing the car’s hardware to prevent its identity being discoverable in the
future. Cars used in crimes are often subsequently destroyed to erase any physical evidence the
perpetrators would leave inside, leading to insurance expenditure on the part of the owner. Our
system is designed to recognize its host vehicle has been stolen, before such events can take place,
for a much higher likelihood of retrieval. Without requiring user input or otherwise making itself
known, it continuously authenticates the driver as the vehicle is operated. Should the driver fail
authentication, the appropriate notifications are made to inform the owner of the car’s theft.
The following factors must be in place to ensure the authentication system is effective and
usable:
• Persistence: Feature data should be collected and analyzed throughout drive time, every
instance the vehicle is driven, to consistently protect against theft.
• Efficiency: A verdict on the legitimacy of the user should be reached in a short period of time
to ensure recovery.
• Unobservability: Authentication should not require conscious input from the driver nor be
visible, to avoid annoying legitimate users or alerting thieves.
• Practicality: Integration of this system should not require extensive hardware or intensive
labor so that it may be employed cheaply and easily.
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3.4 Driver Identification Approach
To accomplish these goals, we offer the system design described herein, which makes use of the
understanding that driving styles are unique to each person. Social preferences, natural talent and
interests, and economic constraints all work to mold the set of places a particular person lives,
works, and recreates, and travel amongst these locations forms a body of driving experience unique
to that person. This, coupled with the person’s typical mental focus while driving and specific
thresholds for risk tolerance and patience, results in a large variety of driving styles from which any
specific person can be distinguished. For example, every driver has some magnitude of acceleration
they typically employ, as well as preferences on braking speed, cornering speed, turn signal use,
and coasting. Several of these are encompassed in acceleration (negative and positive) data which
we use to create features for analysis.
Our system contains Training and Testing modules and its architecture is presented in Figure
3.1.
3.4.1 Training Phase
We must first gather some data of typical driving behavior for a vehicle owner, to be ultimately
compared to new data for authentication purposes in future trips. This is the training stage of
our system, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, and requires a minimum driving time to produce good
accuracy in authentication. In our experiment, we found that users with up to two hours of driving
time entertained the best accuracy. In terms of convenience, the training data does not need to be
accumulated in one continuous drive, but training should be accomplished in a short time frame
after installation for obvious security reasons. It should also include both city and highway driving
for the most accurate cross-section of the driver’s behavior. A specific discussion on training time
and its effects on system accuracy is presented in Section 3.7: Evaluation.
The training phase begins by preprocessing all the data collected by the user. This includes
removing extreme (noise-induced) values, normalization, and isolating important information that
will drive the owner’s features. Preprocessing steps are detailed in Section 3.6 on Driving Events
and Metrics. The features are then computed into the set of probability distributions that make
up the driver’s fingerprint vector. This serves as a basis for comparison when testing future trips.
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A driver’s habits should stay relatively static, but there may be some few cases where they
change over time. This change could be catalyzed by an accident, for example, where a driver
might attempt to conform to a safer driving paradigm thereafter with different characteristics
compared to his previous behavior. A change could also be a very slow unconscious one, where
after some time an impermissible frequency of false alarms could occur. Accordingly, the driver
can reset and redo his training to represent his current behavior.
3.4.2 Testing Phase
Intuitively, driver identification accuracy will benefit from having as much available data as
possible for comparison against the fingerprint vector. We use this type of retroactive method in
our oﬄine testing to determine which features should be included in our fingerprint and test vectors.
In practice, an online driver identification system should actively process an incoming continuous
data source, and waiting until a trip is complete defeats the purpose. To detect an unauthorized
driver and recover a stolen car quickly, we need to compare a test vector to the driver’s fingerprint
vector as early as an appropriate amount of data is available. Accordingly we design an algorithm
that accepts the input data as it is collected continuously and outputs a decision quickly. This is
accomplished by partitioning the data stream into blocks to be tested sequentially as they arrive.
This block size should be long enough to provide suitable accuracy but short enough to quickly
return a result. A suitable block size can be found empirically as we show in Section 3.7 on
Evaluation.
The online testing phase for a block of data from an unauthenticated user begins much in the
same way as the training phase. It undergoes the same preprocessing, with important data selected
and parsed into features making up a test vector D. It then approaches the Predictor, wherein the
following algorithm takes place (Figure 3.2). Let Di denote the current test vector generated by
the driver identification system. Further let F denote the fingerprint vector. Upon obtaining Di,
the predictor estimates whether or not the user is legitimate by comparing F with an augment test
vector Di
⋃(⋃
j∈{1,2,...,i−1}Dj
)
, where D1, D2,...,Di−1 are the previously collected test vectors.
Three metrics are examined after the comparison. The first and second metrics are the similarity
calculations d1 and d2 between F and the augment test vector, as measured by our two comparison
tools. In both cases, lower numbers indicate more similarity. The third metric is the length l of
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the augment test vector, i.e., the number of test vectors that form the augment test vector. For
the test vector Di, the length of the augment test vector is i.
For these three metrics we employ six thresholds. Metric d1 is compared to thresholds t1 low
and t1 high, while d1 is compared to t2 low and t2 high. Threshold tboth is compared with the sum
of d1 and d2. Finally, threshold tl is used to limit l. Based on these metrics and thresholds, the
prediction generates the following decisions:
• If both d1 ≤ t1 low and d2 ≤ t2 low are true, the user is temporarily authorized.
• If one of d1 ≤ t1 low and d2 ≤ t2 low is true, and d1 + d2 ≤ t3, the user is temporarily
authorized.
• In any other case, the user’s identity remains unknown.
• If either d1 > t1 high or d2 > t2 high at any time, then the user is unauthorized.
If l < tl at this time, and the current driver has been temporarily authorized or remains
unknown, then the predictor continues authentication. The next block of input data is processed
when it arrives to generate the new test vector Di+1, and the predictor repeats this process to
continue authentication, i.e., comparing F to Di+1
⋃(⋃
j∈{1,2,...,i}Dj
)
.
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If l ≥ tl, and the above rules resulted in authorization, the user is identified as the owner.
Otherwise if the user remains unknown, authorization fails and an alert is made. Appropriate
follow-up actions may be taken by the legitimate user.
We use the well-known Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) statistical test [41] as well as the total varia-
tion distance [42] to compare the fingerprint and the augment test vectors. Specifically, both vectors
are made up of empirical probability distributions in the form of frequency data stemming from
the collected acceleration data. First, each distribution from the augment test vector undergoes
the K-S test with the respective distribution from the fingerprint vector, returning a conclusion as
to whether or not the two portions of data are from the same distribution. Second, the distance
between the distributions is measured, which provides an additional metric for their variation. The
difference between the vectors is finally calculated using the total number of features (distributions)
in the test vector which fail the K-S test as well as the sum of their variations. The specifics of this
calculation and usage of both tests is covered in 3.7.3.
3.5 Authentication System Design
Our Evaluation in Section 3.7 shows how the approach detailed in Section 3.4 effectively classifies
drivers according to their own behaviors and apart from others’ behaviors. To deploy this technique
into a usable theft detection system entails a number of logistical details and additional system
design. This section offers two possible implementation environments of the Driver Identification
scheme just detailed, methods for handling alerts and false positives for each, and an explanation
of how to handle multiple drivers. Further, having described strengths and weaknesses of several
options for various components within the authentication system, we offer a sample architecture
with some design choices made for a notification application to be installed on the vehicle owner’s
phone.
3.5.1 Implementation Environment
Two basic options exist for making use of our driver identification mechanism for detecting
auto theft. Either it is implemented as an external system or as part of the car itself. The latter is
42
dependent upon the buy-in of the car manufacturer, but could make use of additional features for
better accuracy, while the former can be installed into any car as a commercial product.
We gathered our testing data on a few mobile devices with the Android operating system,
using as previously stated the acceleration information of the vehicle, to generate our features.
Consequently, our driver identification method sees ready use for driver authentication via the
same mobile devices. In this case, a smartphone will be placed within the vehicle to collect the
appropriate data and compare it to the stored profiles. The cheapest of smartphones have the
required sensors (accelerometer and GPS) so the cost requirements here are not high and indeed
comparable to, or cheaper than, the cost of a car alarm. To ensure each type of acceleration can be
distinguished consistently, the phone should be mounted in a static position in the car such that
its orientation does not drift under the effect of the forces it is meant to measure. Finally, once
training is complete, the phone’s mount location should be somewhere inconspicuous so as not to
draw attention to its role as theft identifier.
A second strategy is to implement our theft detection system into the car’s computer. While
we carried out our testing by using Android devices’ accelerometer and GPS data to create our
features, so we can only comment on the accuracy of this platform, we believe an implementation in
the car’s computer operating system will perform similarly well. In fact, it will allow for more direct
measurement of the driver’s acceleration preferences by monitoring gas and brake pedal depression
statistics, so similar or greater accuracy is likely. We leave this implementation to future work
as programming in an Android device was much more practical than in a car’s computer for this
research. However, this will very likely change in the near future as vehicles become smarter, so we
are optimistic that our system can be applied easily to cars in the future. An exciting indication of
this opportunity is the news that vehicles from Audi, Honda, General Motors, and other companies
are beginning to support the Android operating system as the car’s OS [43].
Continual innovation by auto companies also indicates further features could be examined as
more data is made available. For example, not many cars currently send steering wheel data over
the CAN bus such that individuals can parse it from the OBD II port [44], and those that do have
manufacturer-specific methods of doing so which are not readily publicized due to their proprietary
nature. However, steering wheel data could provide a more fine-grained analysis as to how fast a
user is comfortable turning in certain angles, when coupled with speedometer data. A car company
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realizing this could make this data more readily available so our system implemented within the
car’s computer can make use of it. Other behaviors less directly related to actual driving action
could be measured as well, such as turn signal or cruise control usage.
3.5.2 Alert Options
A naive approach might be to alert the police when a theft is detected, but the fact that humans
can be erratic and behave unlike themselves in uncommon circumstances should discourage this
approach. Even a small chance of false alarm spread over a great many users of this technology
would result in a nontrivial amount of wasted time for the authorities, and clearly it is unwise to ”cry
wolf” to the police. However, this approach may be more allowable in the event that this technology
is administered by a security company as in the case of home alarm systems. This company would
then act as an intermediary between the user and the police, making the appropriate efforts to
contact the user and verify the theft or safety of the vehicle and informing the police of actual
theft. Depending on cost, users may prefer to receive alerts themselves, which for this component
of the technology is just a choice in where the alert is sent.
A few options exist for how the user or security company is alerted. For the external system
option of mounting a phone in the car, that phone can be given a very basic plan (adding a device
to an existing plan is commonly very cheap) and the phone can send a text alert to the number(s) of
choice. Otherwise, the mounted phone could send a notification over mobile data to an application
on the owner’s phone. As cars become more connected to the Internet, the same options become
available for internal implementation as well. The message contents can include the location of the
car; this idea currently exists for recovering stolen vehicles [45] but requires knowledge on the part
of the car owner that the car is stolen, which is the functionality this research aims to achieve. In
the external system case, the phone is collecting GPS data anyway, and in the internal system case,
many cars sold today can look up and display GPS data for navigation purposes.
If integrated into the car’s computer, prior to raising an alert, a detected theft event can
trigger a secondary authentication requirement, such as to enter a password to continue using the
vehicle. As mentioned in our introduction, most drivers will be unwilling to enable a security
feature requiring them to enter a password every time they drive, but by only requiring password
entry when abnormal driving behavior is detected, authentication for legitimate users is passive
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Figure 3.3: Driver authentication alert system design
except in a minority of cases of false alarm. Intuitively, one might propose to disable the car upon
unsuccessful secondary authentication. This could impact nearby drivers’ safety if, for example,
the vehicle is being driven on a highway, where it is dangerous to stop, or if power is cut while
the vehicle is in process of turning or crossing an intersection. More safe ways to accomplish this
may be possible though, such as gradually decreasing the permitted speed of the vehicle (allowing
the thief, out of self preservation, to pull over out of harm’s way), and after some time, turning
off the engine. This will be facilitated by informing the driver of the forced deceleration by way of
the car’s display. Other drivers’ safety can also be increased by programmatically turning on the
hazard lights and honking the horn to draw attention.
3.5.3 False Alarm Handling
Biometric security systems which interface directly with the owner of the protected system
have the unique advantage that the annoyance of false alarms can be minimized entirely. As our
proposed system notifies its owner in the case of an alarm, false alarms may occur without any
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impact other than, say, an unnecessary text message or notification received by the owner. While
driving, the owner should ignore text messages regardless.
Applications currently exist which determine if a user is driving by determining from successive
GPS collections that the user is moving too fast to be walking. This mechanism could be included
within the car owner’s theft notification application, suppressing false alarms if the application
determines the owner is driving. This concept breaks down in the event the owner’s car is stolen at
the same time the owner is a passenger in another car, or in the case of multiple authorized users,
wherein the assumption is too weak that one authorized owner moving at vehicle speeds implies
that owner is driving the car. However, this concept could be useful for those individuals who never
share their car and are rarely passengers of another; this functionality could be toggled off under
these rare situations.
We strive to maintain low false alarm rates, and the accuracy we achieve reflects that. We also
note that some users may desire an even more stringent and secure authentication test. In that
context, we emphasize that the chance that the system does not identify a thief can be minimized
by manipulating the false alarm vs. mis-detection rates. This is discussed in further detail in
Section 3.7.3 on Threshold Size. Similarly, we may lower our test thresholds, making the tests
more stringent, and decrease the time required to identify theft. The resulting false alarm increase,
with its very small increase in annoyance, may be worth the added protection to some users.
3.5.4 Multiple Authorized Drivers
The ability to identify the driver of a car, or more specifically for this application, the ability
to identify if the driver of the car is a known individual, allows for multiple legitimate users of one
particular car. Each permitted driver should perform the training phase separately, and after this,
the testing phase will compare the behavior of the current driver to that of each of the owners. If
a match is identified with any of the authorized users, the car is considered safe; if no matches are
returned, it may have been stolen.
Furthermore, multiple profiles may be registered by singular users whose behavior may be
altered due to extenuating circumstances. Individuals may behave differently while accompanied
by certain passengers or while experiencing affecting weather patterns. For example, a teenager may
drive more cautiously and conservatively with parents than with friends, or an experienced driver
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may behave more cautiously during snowy weather than the summer. Of course we expect the
former situation to be infrequent and not the focus of this research as the teenage years comprise a
very small portion of a person’s driving career, but many drivers do live in locations geographically
predisposed to inclement or disparate weather. In this case, that single user may train profiles
respective to, say, summer (normal) and winter (snow), in order to prevent excessive false alarms.
In general most driving is done as a daily routine between the person’s home, occupation, and
home again, with static passengers or usually none at all, so a limited number of profiles should be
sufficient in all but extreme cases.
3.5.5 Proposed Notification Application Architecture
Several options have just been discussed regarding how to handle alerts and false alarms from
the driver identification process. We propose here a notification application to be installed on the
vehicle owner’s phone, and we describe how it may be designed to minimize false alarms. Figure
3.3 illustrates the duties of the self-surveillance system on the left side and those of the notification
application on the right. This figure applies to either the external or internal implementations of
the self-surveillance system, and it describes the series of events undertaken after the system detects
that the current driver does not match any authorized driving profiles:
The self-surveillance system first informs the application that a threat is detected, and the
application responds with an acknowledgment. An attacker may suspect the vehicle has some kind
of surveillance system in it and wish to block outgoing signals. This step indicates to the system if
some jamming attack is taking place or if it is properly able to make outward communications. If
no ack is received, jamming may be assumed, and the self-surveillance system undergoes Plan B.
Plan B is the only part of the figure which sees different functionality based on where the self-
surveillance system is implemented. If it is within the car’s computer, then a password may be
required of the user on the car’s display to allow continued operation. Failed password attempts may
then result in the car beginning to slow itself as described above. If the self-surveillance system
is instead implemented in a phone mounted in the car, then without means of communicating
outward, the best remaining option is then to log information such as the time and GPS locations
and continually seek to broadcast these should it become possible to do so at any future time.
Evidently, this illustrates the main advantage to the in-vehicle implementation.
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If the ack is received, then the self-surveillance system and the user application are able to
communicate. In an effort to minimize false alarms bothering the owner, the two should seek to
establish whether or not they are in close proximity. An affirmation indicates the owner is in the
car, which apart from a tiny minority of cases of carjacking, would indicate the owner is driving
the car and a false alarm has occurred. False alarms may be logged, along with time and GPS
locations, to review in case of some unforeseen attack, or to notify the owner of the need to retrain
the system should they become numerous.
The proximity establishment may be done with a variety of existing methods, including mea-
suring received signal strength (RSS) of signals sent between them, determining if it is possible
to establish a Bluetooth or other short-range connection, or comparing GPS data obtained from
each. Because it is possible to spoof some of these, we recommend trying several methods and
ensuring all pass the criteria indicating proximity, so that it is more logistically difficult to spoof.
We also note that as the self-surveillance system requires some driving time (unique to the drive
and invisible to the driver) to ascertain the driving behaviors, stealing the vehicle while the driver
is near it will not satisfy this requirement.
If the self-surveillance system determines that it and the owner’s phone are not co-located,
a strong indication the car has been stolen. It may thus both notify the hypothetical security
company introduced in Section 3.5.2 (sending GPS information to aid in recovery) and prompt the
user application to send a push notification. In the event that the proximity establishment has
erroneously failed for some reason, this provides a final protection against false alarms. If the car
owner is in fact driving the car, the notification can offer a button to notify the security company
of the false alarm. Otherwise, another button can indicate to the security company that the owner
is indeed not driving the car, so a theft has occurred. If no contact is made to the security company
in a short time (the owner’s phone is dead, or some other extenuating circumstance), they may try
the various means of contact supplied them by the car owner to determine whether or not the theft
has occurred.
In the internal implementation case, a verified theft may communicate back to the self-surveillance
system to initiate the vehicle slowing/disabling scenario and further aid in recovery.
Not pictured in Figure 3.3 (for brevity) is how additional owners’ notification applications would
interact with the self-surveillance system. There are only two minor differences:
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1. The system will wait to initiate Plan B until it determines it is not in close proximity
with any of the owners’ devices which return acks. One owner’s device may be off
while another owner is driving the car.
2. The push notification in each owner’s application will only ask if that owner is
driving the car. A theft will be inferred from all owners indicating they are not, and
the security company will contact the owners if any do not report back.
3.5.6 Impact of Intelligent Transportation Systems
Current technologies now provide collision avoidance, adaptive cruise control, lane keeping, and
other Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) options which impose certain static behaviors on all
drivers using the vehicle, depending on the circumstances encountered. Indeed, these features are
being added on the eventual path to self-driving cars, which will not have any human-driven driving
behaviors at all. Once self-driving cars are ubiquitous, this research will be outdated. However,
we can expect this technology to take quite some time to be adapted in a majority of locations.
This can be compared with drug trials on human subjects, which take an extremely long time,
since absolute human safety must be ensured with high certainty. Beyond the technical challenges,
laws must be written to incorporate the technology into the current system. It has the additional
latency caused by the requirement for existing car owners to purchase new vehicles, which is a
large expense and avoided as long as is feasible by the general population. Legislation is unlikely
to expedite this given the undue burden it would place on most people. Clearly, as reflected in the
general car market, auto manufacturers have an eye to the future in terms of adding ITS to their
cars but are not yet moving forward with total automation. As such, we see application of our
behavioral biometric solution remaining relevant for some time, though we must account for the
impact of ITS on the accuracy of our system.
If our technology is widely adopted, vehicles manufactured with ITS will likely include our
system, so there should be a relatively small number of ITS-enabled vehicles which employ our
external implementation. For these, the applications listed above, collision avoidance, adaptive
cruise control, and lane keeping, will have only minor impacts on our system, due to the infrequency
of their use compared to the overall drive time. The most frequently experienced of these will
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be adaptive cruise control, if the driver uses cruise control, and even then, it will likely behave
somewhat similarly to the driver given that it adapts to environmental events that the driver
themselves would experience and have to react to. In this case, these few events will wash out
of the overall acceleration behaviors. In the majority case, where ITS-enabled cars contain our
system in the car’s computer, said computer will know when it is influencing the driving behavior.
If it undergoes adaptive cruise control, for example, it may simply ignore the acceleration data
experienced during this time.
3.6 Driving Events and Metrics
To illustrate the methodology used by our system to classify users, we begin by describing the
collection of data which we used to prove the concept viable, followed by the processing of this data
into elemental driving events.
3.6.1 Driving Event Types
We identify six driving events encountered in a typical drive: increasing speed, maintain-
ing speed (cruising), coasting, braking, turning, and changing lanes; these are essentially self-
explanatory. We do however note a key observation that these events are all types of acceleration,
as shown in Figure 3.4. Not shown is cruising, which is defined by a lack of force. Increasing speed
is achieved by depressing the gas pedal and causing positive acceleration along the y-axis of the
vehicle. To maintain speed, the driver keeps a constant depression of the gas pedal or uses Cruise
Control, which keeps a steady zero acceleration. Coasting involves slight negative acceleration from
release of the gas pedal and no application of the brakes. Braking invokes a strong negative accel-
eration with the car’s brakes. Turning encounters angular acceleration as force is applied along the
x-axis of the car (perpendicular to the car’s facing direction). Finally, lane changes encounter, in
comparison to full turning, a slight angular acceleration at the beginning and end of the movement.
With this in mind, human preferences in performing these various events are a function of force
tolerance, as well as reasoning and sometimes necessity. For example, approaching a red light with
no traffic around, an individual will brake according to comfort, perception of safety, and care for
vehicle integrity, all functions of force tolerance and reason. Similarly, a driver may prefer to stop
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Figure 3.4: Forces caused by each type of acceleration.
cruising and start coasting some distance out from an impasse, such as a stoplight or wall of traffic,
to avoid wasting gas, while another may continue at high speed until braking is obligatory. In the
event of traffic, outside influence is also a factor, causing some of these events to be more or less
effective than others for identifying personal behavior patterns. It is important, then, to select
those events for which there is the least outside influence causing variation in a driver’s behavior.
Those events will have the features most unique to each person. Refer to Feature Selection in
Section 3.7 where this process is exhibited.
3.6.2 Speed Effects on Events
We also expect variations in users’ behavior at different speeds. A mistake at high speed, for
example, is more dangerous than at low speed, and with this knowledge some drivers may accept
more risk at some speeds than others. With a single partition holding all data, a user might appear
to favor the habits from the range of speed most often traveled in, and potentially different behavior
from other speeds will be ignored. With multiple partitions, the user’s behavior can be determined
for each speed range regardless of the fraction of time spent driving in that range. We evaluate
using speed ranges as sub-features for our driving events, ultimately assembling our fingerprint and
test vectors from the data on the events for each speed range.
As an example, consider Figure 3.5. Here, the top plot shows the positive acceleration distri-
butions for two drivers, from data measured by an accelerometer. Their difference is visible, but
small. The distributions are farthest apart at an acceleration of roughly 1.6 m/s2, where 92% of
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Figure 3.5: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions (ECDFs) of two users’ positive accelera-
tion data (top), followed by ECDFs of that data partitioned by four velocity ranges (bottom)
data for Driver 1 is below this value. Compared to 82% for Driver 2, there is a 10% difference here.
The four plots below this show the same two distributions separated by four velocity ranges (0-20,
20-40, 40-60, and 60+ mph). The first partition looks similar to the full data plot, but the next
three show marked differences between their respective data and the full data plots. Their largest
separations are, in order, 12%, 19%, 26%, and 28%. These large differences combined together can
form a cascade filter that helps us differentiate more effectively between these two users who at
first glance appear somewhat alike.
3.6.3 Data Collection
As mentioned, the six overarching driving events are fundamentally different forms of accelera-
tion. Increasing speed, cruising, coasting, and breaking are all acceleration at varying magnitudes
along the y-axis of the vehicle as illustrated in Figure 3.4. From the frame of reference of the car,
turning and lane changes create force along the x-axis. For this reason we chose the accelerometer
hardware in mobile devices to collect data on acceleration in each dimension. Also necessary is
velocity information so that the acceleration can be partitioned according to speed ranges as just
discussed, so we included GPS hardware as well, which can provide velocity as the time-derivative
of its gathered position data. As acceleration is the time-derivative of velocity, the GPS data can
also provide acceleration data, but along the car’s y-axis only. Having two sources of acceleration
data, we can use each to verify the other for the sake of accuracy.
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We developed an Android application on the Nexus 5 to collect and archive driving trace data,
and distributed this among our volunteers so they could gather data while driving for a short time.
This application records continuously the global position of the device and the forces acting upon
it in each direction. GPS data was queried as frequently as possible, which was roughly once per
second; accelerometer data was gathered at the device’s specified “normal” rate of 50 Hz. Both
sets of data were recorded with their respective timestamps to be later retrieved from the device
for analysis.
3.6.4 Driving Event Extraction
The two sets of data aggregated from GPS and accelerometer offer two sources of acceleration
information. First, acceleration is directly measured by the accelerometer, and second, it can be
calculated from the GPS position data. The differences between these two sources require different
processing methods to produce driving events, which are detailed in their respective sections below.
No calculation is required to render acceleration values from the accelerometer data, but due to
variations in participants’ positioning of the device collecting data, some normalization is required.
For example, we need to ensure the average of the y-component of acceleration is close to zero, as
it should be when the beginning and ending velocities are zero. Almost all data was collected with
the device sitting in the passenger seat, which in modern cars has a very small incline when looking
forward, so the y-acceleration trace would commonly be reduced by a scalar constant so that its
average would be close to zero. Such a calibration is acceptable, but too large of an incline spreads
the force over more than just the y-axis, so we ignore any such data to avoid invalid comparison
with properly collected data.
Noting again that the y-axis acceleration trace should average zero, positive acceleration events
are identified as beginning at a point whose moving average is larger than a standard deviation
more than the overall average of zero. They continue while the acceleration remains above zero.
We discovered that some noise caused by the vibration of the car (which was uniform amongst
all users’ data) prevented separation of coasting and braking, so we treated an overall deceleration
event type as the combination of the two events. These deceleration events are thematically the
same as positive acceleration events, but start at the point whose moving average is more than a
standard deviation below the average of zero. Following these specifications, all points in the y-axis
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acceleration trace which are not identified as positive acceleration or deceleration events represent
cruising events, because speed is maintained when acceleration is near zero. If the velocity is zero
as calculated from the GPS data, the accelerometer data is discarded to avoid including time spent
stationary at stoplights for example.
Turning and lane changes involve perpendicular force, as mentioned, so we look to the x-axis
data for their detection. We found that lane changes could provide indiscernible x-acceleration if
the user made the change slowly, so we ignored them in favor of turning events, which show forces
of similar magnitude to acceleration or deceleration events. The same general strategy was used, to
pick out left and right turns, dependent upon positive or negative direction of force on the x-axis.
Finally, any data not involved in turning events is discarded as it is redundant to the cruising event
data.
To find users’ acceleration and velocity from the GPS position data, the distance between each
point is first calculated. This is an approximation derived from the points’ latitudes and longitudes.
With distance calculated in this manner, velocity and acceleration are simple time derivatives of
the position data. Acceleration data is only along the y-axis here as the distance calculation loses
any direction data, and calculating direction for use in turning acceleration is prohibitive with the
infrequency of data collection. Consequently, turning and lane change events are not considered
for GPS data.
Though the overall data is accurate, at times in all users’ data there is a delay followed by
a receipt of an old data point, now incorrectly timestamped, along with a new one. Due to the
complexity and noteworthy delay involved with communicating with satellites, this issue would
result in some oscillatory noise. For this reason and the normally infrequent collection of data,
acceleration events are not so nicely shaped as they are for the data acquired by the accelerometer,
so these events are parsed differently. Here, a data point is considered part of a positive acceleration
or a deceleration event only if is further than a standard deviation away from the average zero
acceleration. This ignores the tails of acceleration events, which do not usually appear tapered out
in this data. Coasting is again absorbed into deceleration events, and any remaining points with
nonzero velocity are classified as cruising events.
54
3.6.5 Mimicry Attacks
We lastly consider mimicking a driver’s behaviors during the events just listed. To successfully
mimic another driver, avoiding detection by our algorithm, requires a constant attention to several
complex factors. One must regulate each distribution in the test vector to be the same as the
corresponding one in the fingerprint vector. These distributions come from different sources and
apply at different velocity ranges. Furthermore, the measure of ”sameness” is made according to
two different tests combined through several different rules. Each of these factors compounds on
each other, making it utterly implausible to launch such attacks, even disregarding the difficulty of
accessing the data on the owner’s system to study.
3.7 Evaluation
3.7.1 Experiment Framework
We had 31 volunteers participate in this project, representing ages ranging from late teens to
early 60s and included students, faculty, office workers, and self-employed. They were given our
application to run on an Android device. The application was designed such that at the beginning
of a trip, the user would place the device in a horizontal position facing forward, and press a button
to start data collection. No further input was required until reaching the destination, at which
point the user would press a second button to stop data collection. All laws pertaining to phone
usage in vehicles were thereby satisfied and driving safety upheld. These volunteers were tasked
with accumulating at least 30 minutes to an hour of driving data, and some collected up to two
hours.
To quantify the accuracy of our system, we examine its rates of false alarm and mis-detection
as we vary the system parameters. We define the rate of false alarm as the fraction of users who are
not correctly identified as themselves. In this case, the system would render an alarm indicating
the legitimate user is unauthorized. The rate of mis-detection includes users who are incorrectly
identified as other users, where no alarm is raised over the current driver being someone other than
the owner.
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3.7.2 Feature Selection
We are able to extract positive acceleration, deceleration, and cruising events from both the
accelerometer data and the GPS data, as well as turning events from the accelerometer data. We
now show the performance of each of these metrics in a comprehensive test of our datasets and
decide whether or not to include them in our feature vectors.
As discussed earlier, we use the K-S test to compare between two users’ distributions from a
particular event and velocity range. The test measures the distance between the empirical distribu-
tion functions of the two distributions. If the distances are all small, the null hypothesis that they
are from the same probability distribution is decided to be correct. If the largest distance is greater
than a threshold dependent upon a specified significance level and the size of the distributions, the
null hypothesis is rejected, indicating they are from different probability distributions. A smaller
significance level results in a larger threshold value and thereby a larger tolerance for variation in
two distributions ultimately identified as belonging to the same distribution. We find that among
our useful event types, a significance level of 0.005 allowed most users to be identified as them-
selves without others also appearing the same. Consequently this value is used as we exhibit the
performance of each event type.
The Total Variation Distance is similar to the K-S test, but instead of examining the largest
distance between two distributions, it takes a sum of the distances between every point in the
distributions. A smaller total variation distance can indicate two distributions are similar, while a
large distance can imply difference. We find that the K-S test is stronger for comparing the shapes
of the distributions, while the total variation distance is stronger in comparing their overall sizes.
The two tests are combined as discussed in Section 3.4.2 detailing our testing process, with a series
of thresholds we optimize later in this Evaluation section.
For the following several features, figures will be shown to illustrate the performance of each
feature in comparing every driver to every other, for GPS and accelerometer data. Specifically,
with 31 available datasets, there are 930 trials which involve attempting to differentiate one user
from another, and 31 trials where each driver should be identified as themselves. In the Self bar,
the Correct portion shows the number of users (out of 31) correctly identified as themselves, while
the Incorrect portion shows the number of trials where users did not appear like themselves. The
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Figure 3.6: Positive acceleration trial statistics from GPS (left) and accelerometer (right) datasets
Correct portion of the Other bar shows the number of trials (out of 930) where our tests correctly
differentiate between different users, while the Incorrect portion represents users who appear similar
to other users. In short, the Incorrect component to the Self and Other bars represent the false
alarm and theft mis-detection rates, respectively. Good features will have few mis-detections and
as few as possible false alarms, so a perfect figure would show 31 correctly authorized trials and
930 correctly denied trials. Thresholds vary for each type of data, and are selected to provide the
best results and show the potential efficacy of the acceleration type and source.
3.7.2.1 Positive Acceleration
For both the accelerometer and GPS data, positive acceleration events present effective diver-
gence between users. Figure 3.6 shows the results. For the GPS, requiring all velocity ranges to
have nearly equivalent distributions properly identified all 31 users as themselves, but also allowed
users to impersonate others in 116 of 930 such comparisons. The accelerometer data allows fewer
impersonations, 32 of 930 possible, but fails to identify 17 of 31 users as themselves. As the two
sources have different strengths, including both can potentially (and does, as shown later in this
section) produce good results.
The usefulness of these features is logical: a driver’s preferred positive acceleration is only ever
limited with an upper bound by traffic (at stoplights with long lines, for example), so for most
places and times, drivers are able to accelerate as they please. In the case of traffic, the data used
in this experiment was amassed in a city consistently named among the worst cities in the United
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Figure 3.7: Negative acceleration trial statistics from GPS (left) and accelerometer (right) datasets
States for traffic, so whatever inaccuracy traffic can impose is present in our results. By a lower
bound, positive acceleration is never limited except in the cases of risky merging or exceptionally
impatient followers. The latter case is an out-lier, and the former incorporates an individual’s
particular acceptance of risk into the data which can increase rather than limit the accuracy in
discerning between users.
3.7.2.2 Negative Acceleration
As seen in Figure 3.7, deceleration events from the GPS data prove roughly as effective as
positive acceleration events. Indeed, 30 of 31 users are correctly self-identified, and 124 of 930
possible impersonations are allowed using only this data. In contrast, the accelerometer data
does not function well for this feature, with 176 impersonations and only half of the possible self-
identifications.
It does make sense that deceleration might be less useful than acceleration events. Negative
acceleration events have more potential limitations on driver freedom and variation, as they are
more a function of necessity than positive acceleration events. Other drivers’ behavior can induce
braking, by merging or pulling out in front of the subject, or in traffic by simply being numerous.
Stoplights can change unexpectedly, causing attenuated available stopping time such that drivers
have to brake differently than they would otherwise.
The difference in efficacy between the two sources is attributed to the more coarse-grained GPS
data failing to capture brief rapid braking events caused by reactions to the environment instead
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Figure 3.8: Zero acceleration (cruising) trial statistics from GPS (left) and accelerometer (right)
datasets
of driver preference. The accelerometer includes these un-useful reactions along with the useful
information on driver preference, and suffers accordingly.
3.7.2.3 Cruising
Figure 3.8 shows the poor results of identification using cruising data. While only one false
alarm occurred with the GPS data, 198 trials allowed impersonation to take place. Accelerometer
data was considerably worse, with 324 impersonations and just a little more than half of the users
correctly self-identified. This is rather unsurprising, because cruise time depends almost entirely
on the driving locale. Also, variation in speed while maintaining a mostly constant cruising speed
can depend on the car’s cruise control system and changes in terrain as much as it might depend
on a user manually maintaining speed with measurable fluctuation.
3.7.2.4 Turning
Turning data from the accelerometer produces the results in Figure 3.9. Intuitively, drivers
handle cornering according to their force tolerance and perceived safety, as mentioned before. In
practice, this data is not very effective. At best, only 3 of 31 self-identification tests resulted in false
alarms, but about half of the possible 930 impersonations were allowed. The infrequency of turning
events in comparison with positive or negative acceleration events likely reduces the usefulness of
this data, and more data could result in better performance. If we had enough data to properly
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Figure 3.10: Trial statistics without (left) and with (right) veloc-
ity range partitioning of driving data
train the system on turning events, it would still however require too much data-gathering time in
testing the identity of new users to efficiently render a decision, which is the greater concern.
3.7.2.5 Velocity Range Partitioning
Finally, Figure 3.10 illustrates the benefits afforded by splitting the training and testing datasets
by the velocity of each data point. At left is the best result obtainable without the use of speed
ranges, while the right chart shows the better result from their use. While the mis-detection rate
holds static, the false alarm rate collapses from six to one, providing more confidence in our system’s
ability to correctly identify users as themselves. This equates to 97% self-identification and 91%
differentiation rate.
The velocity ranges used here are chosen such that the following concerns are satisfied:
• The divisions should be numerous enough to allow for all the behavioral differences a person
could make based on speed.
• The divisions should be small enough such that the lower bound does not “feel” significantly
different than the upper bound.
• The divisions should be few enough and sufficiently large to accumulate adequate data for
comparison in a timely manner, so decisions can be made efficiently.
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Empirical testing evinced a set of ranges most appropriate for our experiment comprised of 0-20,
20-40, 40-60, and 60+ mph.
3.7.2.6 Feature Selection Summary
We found that both sources of acceleration data were useful as they both had strengths and
weaknesses. The data from the accelerometer was very fine-grained, being measured fifty times
per second, and was able to be parsed into acceleration events quite well. However the magnitudes
of the forces upon the accelerometer did not show enough variation to identify unique users with
high accuracy by itself. This may be due to the device’s placement on the cushioned passenger
seat, which likely dulled the force somewhat. The acceleration as calculated from position data, in
contrast, had more accurate magnitudes due to its direct calculation from the location trace. GPS
is accurate to within 3-7 meters with 95% confidence [46], so apart from some local inaccuracies
the overall traces were highly accurate. Nevertheless those local inaccuracies were large, so the
GPS data was also insufficient for identification on its own. Finally, previously stated as a benefit
to the negative acceleration feature, GPS data contributes its ability to often ignore reactive (non-
preferential) actions that are too brief for the frequency of data collection.
Taking from the useful events, we have features including (1) positive acceleration measured by
the accelerometer and (2) combined positive and negative acceleration calculated from the GPS
position measurement. Both features are finally subdivided into four velocity ranges, for a total
of eight features, ultimately resulting in 97% self-identification and 91% differentiation rates. Our
Predictor component’s set of thresholds is set to accommodate the total number of feature tests in
its classification of drivers.
3.7.3 Threshold Size
The number of features required to pass authentication has an effect on the rate a car owner
is authorized as well as the rate illegitimate users are authorized. We have eight features and two
tests performed on each feature. With the data split into ten blocks, there are thus a total of 160
feature tests, 80 for each test type. To use both test types, we combine them according to several
rules and thresholds (Section 3.4.2). For the K-S test, we have thresholds specifying the maximum
number of tests which may be failed while still resulting in authorization. For the total variation
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Figure 3.11: Finding an optimized threshold
distance, we specify the maximum variation distance to which the tests may be summed. Lower
thresholds will prevent more users from being erroneously authorized, but will reduce the number
of rightful owners being authorized. High thresholds can ensure all legitimate users are authorized,
but so will more thieves.
For this portion of the experiment, full training and testing datasets are used, for the broadest
applicable view of the data. These datasets are tested sequentially block by block. To find the
optimal set of thresholds, we find the point where the false alarm and mis-detection curves intersect
in Figure 3.11. In this figure, we search the possible thresholds to find the mis-detection rate
associated with a specific false alarm rate. We find an intersection with lowest total error nearest
3 false alarms, identifying all but roughly a tenth of illegitimate users.
We also note that with a different threshold selection, we can reduce illegitimate access to the
neighborhood of 6% with 16% false alarm rate. This boost to the false alarm rate might be worth
the added security to some individuals. As we’ve minimized the impact of false alarm rates with our
notification application design, users may find this false alarm rate unobtrusive enough to choose
the very stringent and consequently secure threshold set.
3.7.4 Training Data Size
The training process for a classifier benefits from an abundance of data (though sometimes too
much data can make a classifier too specific and not applicable to new data). If the application of
the classifier is to prevent irretrievable vehicle theft, the user would prefer to have this protection
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Figure 3.12: Effects of training dataset size on error rates
as soon as possible. We examine the impact of different training sizes here, to find out how much
data collection is necessary before a user can begin protecting the car.
As our volunteers collected differing amounts of data, we base our training data size on the
datasets supplied by our volunteers who drove for smaller amounts of time. This size is broken into
ten blocks to see the effects of increasing the data size on our false alarm and mis-detection rates
for all drivers. The maximum training data allowed here is roughly 450 seconds (450 points) worth
of positive and negative acceleration from the GPS data, and 180 seconds (9000 points) of positive
acceleration measured by the accelerometer. For reference, our users accomplished this amount
in 25-45 minutes depending on how much time was spent cruising or at stop lights. All available
testing data is used, and the threshold set used for authentication is that arrived at in the previous
section on Threshold Size. The results are shown in Figure 3.12.
As expected, the best accuracy is attained with all available blocks of data included. These
error rates are higher than those we measure in other tests, because we are restricted to the small
dataset size. Additionally, because the threshold set is constant, optimized for the full available
training size, the false alarms are slightly erratic before settling to lower values in later blocks. Of
largest impact here is the fall of the mis-detection rate showing better theft detection with larger
training data. We recommend 1.5-2 hours of training time, because in perusing the results, we find
those users who provided that amount of data almost universally were identified as themselves with
the least number of failed feature tests, and were rarely confused with other drivers (mis-detected).
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Figure 3.13: Effects of testing dataset size on error rates
3.7.5 Testing Data Size
The amount of data available for testing unsurprisingly has effects on accuracy similar to the
training data. The desire is again to require only a small amount of data, this time in order to
perform accurate authentication in time to quickly identify a theft. We therefore analyze the effect
of differing testing sizes to ascertain the appropriate length of testing data collection.
As with the training size experiment, we restrict the amount of data allowed to be 450 seconds
of GPS sourced positive and negative acceleration alongside 180 seconds of accelerometer sourced
positive acceleration. Again, this equates to 25-45 minutes of driving to ensure the larger datasets
do not skew the results to a higher accuracy and a uniform amount of data is used. We allow full
training datasets, however, as users in the real world will have full control of their training phase.
The threshold set is held constant, using the results of the Threshold Size study. Results appear
in Figure 3.13:
It is important to note again that the thresholds used for this examination of testing dtaa size
were optimized for all data available. This threshold set works quite well for the proper test size,
and this emphasizes the importance of the minimum length of time used for gathering testing data.
It also displays the effect of increasing test data on the testing stringency. To begin, all users are
permitted access, resulting in no false alarms but 100% mis-detection, and by the time all 10 blocks
of data are used, most unauthorized users are detected and some legitimate users begin to generate
false alarms. It is therefore important also to prevent testing data size to grow too large and too
specific.
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Figure 3.14: Effects of testing dataset size on K-S test p-values
As further evidence of the effect of additional data, consider Figure 3.14. As discussed, the
K-S test returns a decision on whether or not two datasets are from the same distribution, and it
does so by estimating the probability that the two datasets’ empirical distributions would be the
measured distance apart while still being part of the same overall distribution. This is referred to as
the p-value, and points on this figure are the average p-values for all feature tests between users as
additional data is included. The line labeled “Self” refers to the average of self-identification tests,
and by the criteria above, the p-values for these tests should be large. The line labeled “Others”
refers to the average of those tests between distinct users, and these p-values should be small. The
figure shows self-identification tests remaining at a flat rate, indicating that it takes very little time
to match one’s testing data with one’s own training data. As desired, the p-values for the Others
line are below those for the Self line. Further, while it takes longer to rule out other users than it
does to self-identify, our results show that the p-values diverge quickly after a few final data blocks
are added to the testing data.
3.7.6 Evaluation Summary
To conclude this evaluation, we present the following successes:
• We found effective features including positive acceleration measured by the accelerometer as
well as positive and negative acceleration measured by the GPS.
• We found further effective features in partitioning the above according to specific velocity
ranges.
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• We showed this collection of features capable of attaining 97% self-identification and 91%
differentiation accuracies.
• We illustrated the effects of varying our testing thresholds and the ability to attain very low
mis-detection (around 7%) by allowing slightly higher false alarm rates.
• We analyzed the size of training and testing data to determine the requirements for robust
accuracy.
3.8 Summary
In this work, we have proposed a fast automatic driver recognition system that continuously
authenticates the driver as the vehicle is operated. Our basic idea is to extract unique features
from the driving behavior, which cannot be exactly reproduced by a thief driving away in the stolen
car. Through an in-depth investigation of the typical driving events, we identified effective driving
features (i.e., positive and negative accelerations, at multiple speed ranges) to distinguish between
the car owner and any unauthorized users. We performed extensive experimental evaluation using
the driving data collected from 31 volunteers. Our experiment results show that the proposed
system can successfully distinguish that the current driver is the car owner, with 97% accuracy,
while also preventing impersonation 91% of the time.
66
CHAPTER 4
PDF MIRAGE: CONTENT MASKING ATTACK ON INFORMATION-BASED
ONLINE SERVICES1
4.1 Introduction
Designed as a solution for displaying formatted information consistently on computers with
myriad hardware and software configurations, Adobe’s Portable Document Format (PDF) has
become the standard for electronic documents. Academic and collegiate papers, business write-ups
and fact sheets, advertisements for print, and anything else meant to be viewed as a final product
make use of the PDF standard. Indeed, there is an element of constancy implied in the creation of
a PDF document. End users cannot easily change the text of a PDF document, so most come to
expect a degree of integrity present in all PDF documents encountered.
Attacks are studied and corresponding defenses developed dealing with arbitrary code execution
through some allowances made by Adobe to execute JavaScript within the rendering process of a
PDF file [47] [48] or from other rendering vulnerabilities [49] [50]. These typically allow data
exfiltration, botnet creation, or other objectives unrelated to the PDF file itself aside from using
it as a delivery mechanism [51] [52] [53] [54]. We present a class of attacks against the content
integrity of PDF documents themselves, and following this, describe and test a comprehensive
defense method against these attacks. Without changing the appearance of a PDF, we are able to
alter how several information-based services see it, with the following implications:
We demonstrate how academic paper writers can collude with multiple conference reviewers,
by altering a paper invisibly to humans, to be assigned to those reviewers by automatic reviewer
assignment systems, such as that used by the IEEE International Conference on Computer Com-
munications (INFOCOM) [55] that openly publishes its automated algorithm. We simulate this
reviewer assignment system using 100 sample academic papers and a corpus of 2094 papers from
1This chapter was published in the USENIX Security Symposium 2017 [2]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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114 reviewers of a past security conference, finding that we can cause any of said sample papers to
match with any reviewer.
We show how an unethical student can invisibly alter a document to avoid plagiarism detection,
namely the dominant market share Turnitin [56], and generalize methods to target specific small
plagiarism similarity scores to simulate the few false positives such systems typically detect. We
illustrate this attack by inducing plagiarism scores, as measured by Turnitin, from 0-100% in 10
academic papers without changing their appearance.
Lastly, we show real-world examples of making leading search engines display arbitrary (poten-
tially spam, offensive material, etc.) results for innocuous keywords. We have successfully caused
Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo to index five documents under keywords not displayed in those
documents.
These systems have in common the need to scrape PDFs for their content for further processing
or searching within. Online conference paper or other document repositories and companies that
index the Internet require text from PDFs so they may be located via search. Natural language pro-
cessing tools scrape PDFs to discover the topics within, and this information is used in several large
conferences to assign unpublished work to conference reviewers as well as in document repositories
to categorize large volumes of works without manual effort. Finally, plagiarism checkers require
text from new articles for comparison against currently published work to detect impermissible
similarity.
Scraping of PDF documents can be done in an automated setting by text extraction tools
such as the PDFMiner package [57]. However, fonts of any name may be embedded in the PDF
document, and these tools cannot check the fonts’ authenticity. A font is actually akin to an
encoding mechanism, which maps keys pressed on a keyboard to glyphs representing those keys.
Without some way to check the validity of fonts in a PDF, which glyphs a font maps keys to
is arbitrary. Moreover, humans reading a PDF read the rendered version of what a tool such
as PDFMiner reads, meaning that machines and humans are on opposite ends of this encoding
mechanism and may be caused to read different information.
Consequently, the various PDF document scraping environments may be misused through the
remapping of keys to arbitrary rendered glyphs. Using one or more custom fonts, an attacker may
cause a word to be rendered as another word by switching the glyph mapping within the font file,
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or rather change the underlying text while keeping a constant rendered output. That is to say, in
a document containing the word “kind” an attacker may force that to be rendered as “mean” with
a custom font mapping k to m, i to e, n to a, and d to n, so the human now sees “mean” while
the machine still sees “kind”; or to avoid human detection an attacker can change the underlying
text to “mean” and use a font with the reverse mapping to render it as “kind” for the human to
see. The latter tactic subverts aforementioned end applications, while still rendering PDFs in all
appearances normal to humans. We refer to this as a content masking attack, as humans are caused
to view a masked version of the content these computer systems read.
To assign papers to reviewers for a conference, several large conferences employ automated
systems to compare the subject paper with a corpus of papers written by each reviewer to find
the best match. This matching is executed upon the most important topics, or keywords, found in
the paper via natural language processing methods. If an author replaces the keywords of a paper
with those of a reviewer’s paper, a high match is guaranteed, and the two may thereby collude.
By creating custom glyph mappings for characters, the masked paper can make perfect sense to
the human eye, while the underlying text read by the machine has many substituted words which
would not make sense to a human reader. This exploit has the technical challenges of replacing
words of differing lengths (larger and smaller replacements require different methods) and also
constructing multiple fonts required for different mappings of the same letter (for example, to map
the word “green” to “brown” requires two different font mappings for e). A naive defense could
check the number of fonts embedded, so in Section 4.4 we design algorithms to minimize the number
of auxiliary fonts used, in order to avoid detection. To evaluate, we construct our own automatic
reviewer assignment system reproducing the current INFOCOM system [55], and show that for 100
test papers, targeting a specific reviewer is possible by masking 4-9 unique words in most papers
and no more than 12 for all tested.
This content masking attack also undermines plagiarism detection. In this case, we need only
switch out isolated characters to change plagiarized text to text never written before, while again
masking these changes as the original text to the human reader. In fact, as most papers have a
small (false positive) percentage of similarity present due to common phrases within the English
language, this method simulates that by varying the number of characters changed, to simulate the
usual small but nonzero plagiarism percentage. Only one font is required to make this mapping, as
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the resultant text does not need to make sense to the plagiarism detector. Thus, say, all rendered
e’s may be represented by some other letter in a font that maps that key to the glyph e, and other
letters may be changed similarly, building a one-to-one mapping covering at most all letters. The
challenge is to target a small plagiarism percentage, but accomplishing that as we do in Section
4.5, a single embedded font bearing the name of a popular font will cause no suspicion.
Finally, search engines and document repositories may be subverted to display unexpected
content also. Here, we may replace the entire text of a PDF without changing the rendered view,
with a variety of implications. One may hide advertisements in academic papers or business fact
sheets, for example, to spam users searching for information. In this exploit, the attacker should
replace an entire document with the fewest number of fonts necessary, to avoid seeming particularly
unusual. This must be done in a different way than for the topic matching exploit, due to changing
the entire document rather than a few words, so we outline another method in Section 4.6. We
then test it on popular search engines, finding that Yahoo!, Bing, and DuckDuckGo are susceptible.
4.2 Background Information
4.2.1 PDF Text Extraction
The Adobe PDF standard contains eight basic types of objects, including strings. Strings house
the text in a document, including plain text, octal or hexadecimal representations of plain text,
or text with some type of encoding [58]. PDF rendering software treats each string as a series of
character identifiers (CIDs), each mapping to its corresponding glyph within the font associated
with that string via the Character Map (CMap) [59]. A series of glyphs is thus displayed.
Text information extracted from PDF files by using tools like the Python package PDFMiner.
These tools extract text by copying the plaintext from all string objects in a PDF file. Though
these tools can extract the font name for each string as well, a whitelist will not defend against this
attack, as fonts may be given any name.
4.2.2 Topic Matching
The exponential growth of human knowledge/record keeping and the ease of its access demands
an efficient means of providing context-relevant search results, stemming the research field of natural
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language processing. This field extracts the specific subject of a document without the need for
human classification. The ultimate goal of useful search results prompts the companion research
field of matching keywords to topics which has been tackled by the leading search engines.
Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI) is a popular natural language processing algorithm for ex-
tracting topics from documents. The LSI approach infers synonymous words/phrases to be those
with similar surrounding contexts, rather than constructing a thesaurus. These detected patterns
can allow singular value decomposition to reduce the number of important words in a document
such that it may be represented by a small subset. This small subset, of cardinality k, then con-
tains frequency data for each element, such that the document may be represented by a dot in
k-space. Similarity between documents is easily calculated via their Euclidean distances apart in
this geometric representation [60].
Latent Dirichlet Allocation is a newer popular topic extraction algorithm, which is generally
speaking a probabilistic extension of LSI [55]. Topics are generated as collections of related words,
using supervised learning. The probability of a document corresponding to each of the predefined
topics is calculated based on how well the words within the document correspond to the words
within each topic [61, 62].
Topic matching is used within the automation of the review assignment process for several large
conferences, such as the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) or
the IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM). These conferences
receive many submissions and have many reviewers, and the manual task of finding the most suitable
reviewers for each paper is onerous, so they automate by comparing topics extracted from subject
papers and papers published by reviewers. The authors of [55] execute a performance comparison
between LSI and LDA for use in the present (as of 2016) INFOCOM reviewer assignment system,
which uses PDFMiner for text extraction, finding LSI to work well with the academic papers
submitted to that conference. We accordingly perform our experiments using LSI to determine the
important keywords of each paper, and note that the attack functions equivalently using LDA.
4.2.3 Plagiarism Detection
Turnitin, LLC has the dominant market share for plagiarism detection software. Its software
is proprietary, but current documentation states “Turnitin will not accept PDF image files, forms,
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or portfolios, files that do not contain highlightable text...” [56], indicating that PDFMiner or
some similar internally developed tool is used to scrape the text from PDF documents. We may
assume from the lack of support for image files that optical character recognition (OCR) is not
used, meaning that our proposed attack should succeed, which is proved in Section 4.5.2.
Additionally, the Turnitin documentation states that “All document data must be encoded
using UTF-8 character set” [63]. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, text may have custom encodings,
but here we find they are not permitted by Turnitin. This disallows any attack where text, gibberish
in appearance, is translated via decoding into legible text. However, no restriction on fonts is in
place, due to the necessary ability for Turnitin’s client institutions to specify their own format
requirements.
4.2.4 Document Indexing
Extracting topics from a document is somewhat of a subproblem to the larger issue of document
indexing. As information highly relevant to a search may appear in a small portion of a document,
simply relying on the overall topic of every document to infer relevancy to a search may miss some
useful results. A search engine should do more than simply topic modeling to show results for a
query. In fact, Google uses more than 200 metrics to determine search relevancy [64], including its
famous PageRank system of inferring quality of a site based on the number of sites linking to it
[65].
Though documentation is sparse on other search engines such as Bing or Yahoo, Google does
host some discussion of its treatment of PDF files. It states that they can index “textual content
. . . from PDF files that use various kinds of character encodings” [66] but that aren’t encrypted.
“If the text is embedded as images, we may process the images with OCR algorithms to extract
the text” [66], but for our content masking attack, text is not embedded as images, so logically the
system would not perform OCR. Our experiment finds out for sure for Google, Bing, Yahoo, and
DuckDuckGo in Section 4.6.2.
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4.3 Masking Font Creation
The content masking attack is facilitated by the ability to embed custom fonts within PDF
documents. In fact, having all fonts embedded is a formatting requirement for the submission of
academic papers to conferences. However, no integrity check is performed on those fonts as to the
proper correlation between text strings within the PDF file and the respective glyphs rendered in
the PDF viewer. An attacker may map characters to arbitrary glyphs and alter the text extracted
from a PDF document while it appears unchanged to humans in a PDF viewer. This requires two
steps, firstly to create the requisite font files and secondly to encode the text via these font files.
The first step may employ one of the multiple open source multi-platform font editing tools
such as FontForge [67]. With this tool, one can open a font and directly edit the character glyphs
with the typical vector graphics toolbox, or copy the glyph for a character and paste it into the
entry for another character. One can then edit the PDF file directly with open source tools such as
QPDF [68], or in the case of manipulating academic papers, quicken the process by adding custom
fonts in LATEX, and aliasing each to a simple command [69]. We employ the latter method for
its greater ease. It employs the program ttf2tfm, included with LATEX, to convert TrueType fonts
to “TeX font metric” fonts which are usable by LATEX. Two LATEXcode files are supplied by [69]:
T1-WGL4.enc for encoding, and t1custom.fd for easy importing of the font into a LATEXdocument.
The second step of choosing how to mask this content and what in a document to encode with
custom fonts depends on the system targeted, and the technique and evaluation for each of the
three scenarios introduced in Section 4.1 appears in the following three sections.
4.4 Content Masking Attack On Conference Reviewer Assignment Systems
As learned in Section 4.2.2, topic matching works from groups of words constituting the main
topic of the document. Assignment of conference paper submissions to reviewers is accomplished by
finding the highest similarity between detected topics within submissions and those within a corpus
of reviewers’ papers. Meanwhile, a lazy paper writer may wish to collude with specific reviewers,
know of some more generous to papers, or just think reviewers may be less critical of papers not
within their specializations. This lazy writer needs to change the paper topic to target a specific
reviewer, replacing words corresponding to the topic of the paper with words comprising the topic
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of a paper from the reviewer’s corpus, while being masked as the original words to still make visual
sense. We now discuss the challenges for this attack and methods to target one or more reviewers,
and subsequently evaluate the attack efficacy.
4.4.1 Construct Word and Character Maps
We primarily require a list of original words within the subject document to change, and a
list of words from the target document to which to change these original words. The new words
will then be masked to display as the original words using the masking fonts described in Section
4.3. First, any stopwords within the document should be eliminated from consideration. These are
common words within the paper’s language, such as “the,” “of,” “her,” or “from.” Stopwords may
be removed by using existing tools like the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) Python package [70].
From here an attacker can replace the most frequently used words in the subject paper with the
most frequently used words in the target reviewers paper. This will result in the most frequently
used words in the target paper also appearing in the subject paper, for a high similarity score as
measured by the LSI method within the automatic reviewer assignment system.
Consider word lists A and B having constituent words {a1, a2, ..., an} and {b1, b2, ..., bn} which
are in descending order of appearance within the subject and target papers, respectively. An
attacker wishes to replace words A with topic B and must therefore replace each word ai within
the text of the subject paper with a word bi, encoded using some font(s) to render bi the same
graphically as ai (a word mapping). No other words should/need be changed. Consequently, the
objective is to construct a mapping between the letters of each bi and ai (a character mapping).
If ai and bi are character arrays {ai[1], ai[2], ..., ai[pi]} and {bi[1], bi[2], ..., bi[qi]}, then the attacker
should construct a masking font such that the character bi[1] maps to the glyph ai[1], bi[2] to ai[2],
etc. We may consider this analogous to a map data structure, where bi[1] is a key and ai[1] its
value, and so on. Two challenges naturally arise in constructing the required character mappings:
4.4.1.1 One-to-Many Character Mapping
From the brief example in Section 4.1 of changing the word green to brown, we know that in
terms of a map data structure there is a collision for the key e and the values o and w, such that
an attacker will require two masking font ”maps” to render green as brown. The first challenge
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Algorithm 4.1 Build Character Map
Input: subject paper s, target paper t
Output: character mapping C : B → A, encoding fonts F = {f1, f2, ..., fx}
1: A← top k topic words of LSI(s)
2: B ← top k topic words of LSI(t)
3: C ← empty character map
4: for i← 1 to k do
5: pi ← length(ai)
6: qi ← length(bi)
7: if pi < qi then . favorable mapping
8: for j ← 1 to pi do
9: C ← C ∪ {(bi[j], ai[j])}
10: for j ← pi + 1 to qi do
11: C ← C ∪ {(bi[j], ∅)}
12: else if pi > qi then . unfavorable mapping
13: for j ← 1 to qi − 1 do
14: C ← C ∪ {(bi[j], ai[j])}
15: rest← combine {ai[qi], ..., ai[pi]}
16: C ← C ∪ {(bi[qi], rest)}
17: else . equal word length
18: for j ← 1 to qi do
19: C ← C ∪ {(bi[j], ai[j])}
20: x← largest number of key collisions in C
21: temp← C
22: for i← 1 to x do . build fonts
23: fi ← empty font
24: for each c ∈ C do
25: if value in c is ∅ then
26: C ← C \ {c}
27: use clearing font for key in c
28: else if no key collision between c, fi then
29: C ← C \ {c}
30: fi ← fi ∪ {c}
31: F ← F ∪ fi
32: C ← temp
33: return C,F
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Figure 4.1: Handling the word length disparity challenge.
is to minimize the number of fonts required in the document, so as to avoid suspicion, while fully
switching topic A for B. This problem is not delimited by word: some character mappings may be
reused in the same or other words, and many may not. Additionally, changing all of the words in
A to those in B may be unnecessary, which also impacts the number of one-to-many mappings and
resultant number of required font files. If fewer words must be changed while ensuring the required
similarity between papers, fewer fonts may be required, and a naive font count threshold defense
will be less effective.
4.4.1.2 Word Length Disparity
Further, the lengths pi and qi of words ai and bi may differ, causing ai to be longer than bi or
vice versa. If pi > qi, to render bi as ai, a font file entry is necessary for the letter bi[qi] mapping
to the last pi − qi + 1 letters of ai. Several additional fonts may be necessary if some bi ∈ B have
the same last character. Thus, we define a favorable keyword mapping as a word mapping bi → ai
such that pi < qi. In this case, only a single clearing font is needed, wherein all characters map
to a blank glyph of no width. Figure 4.1 illustrates handling favorable and unfavorable mappings,
with each box representing a character. In practice, a blank glyph of no width is in fact a single
dot, of width (and height) equal to the smallest unit of measure within a font drawing program.
In contrast, an i is 569 units wide (and a w is 1500 units wide), so this dot will not be rendered
at all. And because this clearing font has all letters map to no-width blanks, it will be the only
additional font required if ∀i, pi < qi, hence its favorability.
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4.4.2 Matching One or More Papers to One Reviewer
Mapping of words from B to A is by their original descending order of frequency within the
target and subject papers, respectively. Algorithm 4.1 shows the overall encoding process and
begins by running the LSI model on the subject and target papers, then constructing a map
between characters in k of the topic words returned. Then, the mapping is added to C for each
character, for each word of B, to the corresponding character(s) in the corresponding word of A.
Here, comments (Lines 7, 12, 17) indicate the steps taken for favorable and unfavorable mappings
and the case when both words are of the same length. Finally at Line 22, the mappings in C
are broken up into collections to be made into custom masking fonts, with the exception of those
characters from favorable mappings which map to null, for which the previously introduced single
clearing font is used. Resulting from this algorithm are fonts to be used for each character of the
words in B to mask them as the words in A. If the attacker has multiple papers under submission,
this process may be repeated independently for each paper.
4.4.3 Matching One Paper to Multiple Reviewers
For a better chance at cheating the peer review process and to collude with multiple reviewers,
the content masking attack can be adapted to split up the masked words among two (or more)
different lists of frequently used words. Instead of mapping between word lists A and B, the attacker
will map between A and B and A and C, such that a1 will be replaced with b1 part of the time
and c1 the rest of the time, and so on. The method is otherwise the same as shown in Algorithm
4.1, but has its own challenge.
Intuition would suggest replacing a1 half of the time with b1 and half of the time with c1.
However, the requirement for the attacker’s paper to be the most similar of a large number of
papers to a reviewer’s paper and also the most similar of all others to another reviewer’s paper
is quite stringent. The intuitive method fails as the similarity score for one target reviewer will
be high enough but the other too low. So we use an iterative refinement method which tunes the
replacement percentages according to the calculated similarity scores until they are both the highest
among their peers. This is generalizable to more than two reviewers, by refining the percentages
proportionally according to the successive differences in similarity scores between the subject paper
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and each of the target papers. We match one paper to three reviewers in Section 4.4.4, the typical
number of reviewers to which papers are assigned (barring contention in reviews, which would not
happen during collusion).
4.4.4 Experiment
We have built a conference simulation system reproducing the INFOCOM automatic assignment
process described in [55]. We imported into this system 114 TPC members from a well-known
recent security conference as reviewers, and downloaded a collection of each of these reviewers’
papers published in recent years. In total, this comprised 2094 papers used as training data for the
automatic reviewer assignment system. For testing data, we also downloaded 100 papers published
in the greater Computer Science field. Our experiment, then, is to test the topic matching of the
test papers with the training papers, via our content masking attack. Following are evaluations of
the content masking attack matching one paper to one reviewer, multiple papers to one reviewer,
and one paper to multiple reviewers.
The automatic reviewer assignment process compares a subject paper with every paper from
the collection of reviewers’ papers to gather a list of similarity scores. The reviewer with the highest
similarity score is assigned the paper to judge (if available). We therefore aim to change a testing
paper topic to a training paper topic, and to examine how well this works with all papers. For
each such pair of papers, then, we replace the frequently appearing words A in the testing paper
with those frequently appearing words B in the training paper via Algorithm 4.1. We test the
topic matching of each of the 100 testing papers against our training data to see what is required
to induce a match.
For each pair of training and testing papers, we replace important words in the testing paper
one by one, to see how many replacements are needed to make that pair the most similar. Figure
4.2 illustrates this iterative process for one example training/testing paper pair, showing resultant
similarity scores with blue stars showing the desired matching. The box plots show where the
greatest concentration of the 2094 similarity scores dwell, while red pluses show outliers. The blue
stars which emerge to the top correspond to the similarity scores between the testing paper and
the target training paper. Figure 4.2 shows a clear separation of that similarity score from the
rest after replacing 9 words, meaning that for this pair, content masking all appearances of those
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Figure 4.2: Similarity scores relative to amount of words masked.
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Figure 4.4: Masking font requirements
for all 100 testing papers.
9 unique words in the testing paper will result in its assignment to the reviewer who wrote that
training paper.
Performing this process for all 100 testing papers, we compile the results into Figure 4.3, which
displays the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the number of words requiring replacement.
Evidently, all 100 papers may be matched with the target with 12 words or fewer masked. The
sharp jump appearing from 4-9 words indicates that most papers can be successfully targeted to a
specific reviewer masking between 4 and 9 words. The font requirements for replacing these words
is then represented in Figure 4.4. A majority of papers require 3 or fewer masking fonts, while
almost all of them need only as many as 5. This is a comparatively small number and should go
unnoticed among the collection of fonts natural to academic papers. For example, this paper has
some 19 embedded fonts, between bold/italic variants, fonts used in figures, and one picture font
used in Table 4.8.
79
0 50 100
Number of masking fonts
0
20
40
60
80
100
N
um
be
r o
f p
ap
er
s
Figure 4.5: Masking font requirements
for matching from 1 to all 100 testing
papers to a single reviewer.
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Number of words masked
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Si
m
ila
rit
y
Figure 4.6: Similarity scores relative
to amount of words masked, between
a paper and three reviewers.
Should an author wish to have multiple submitted papers all assigned to a target reviewer, the
author may simply repeat the content masking process on each paper. While in the previous case
we find that an average of 3 or 4 fonts is necessary to make a single test paper sufficiently similar to
the target training paper, that needs not directly translate to 3 or 4 fonts per paper with multiple
papers. Some fonts may be reused among papers, resulting in fewer overall fonts used. Figure 4.5
confirms this, showing a trend more logarithmic than linear.
Finally, we evaluate the iterative refinement method to split masked words among three review-
ers’ papers as discussed in Section 4.4.3. Figure 4.6 shows that the similarity scores for the three
target reviewers (blue star, black circle, and green triangle) consistently increase; after some 70
words masked, the subject paper is more similar to the three target papers than any others.
4.5 Content Masking Attack Against Plagiarism Detection
While a method similar to the topic matching subversion technique just outlined may be used to
hide plagiarism, fewer requirements constrain the plagiarist than the lazy author targeting a specific
reviewer in a conference. Specifically, an attacker needs only make the underlying text different
than the rendered, plagiarized text. The underlying text does not need to be actual words, and so
only one font is needed, ensuring the naive defense of limiting fonts is defeated. This scrambling font
is just a random scrambling of the characters. Each original letter is replaced with the letter which
displays as the original. Resulting is a human-legible PDF document which appears as gibberish
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to Turnitin and necessarily has a similarity score of 0%. Details and options for this method are
below, followed by an evaluation of each option.
4.5.1 Targeting a Specific Plagiarism Score
Because Turnitin is a similarity checker, not a plagiarism detector, it relies on the human factor
to actually detect plagiarism. Turnitin informs the individual with grading duties of any pieces of
similar prose, which naturally arise due to the plethora of written work in existence and the human
tendency toward common patterns and figures of speech. It is unlikely then, and would stand out
to the grader, that a submission would have 0% similarity with anything ever written. We offer
and evaluate two methods an attacker can use to target a specific (low but non-zero) similarity
score and more likely go unnoticed, which are by letter and by word.
In the by letter method, the attacker begins with a scrambling font and removes characters from
being scrambled successively until a target percentage of the text is not being replaced. Intuitively,
this small target percentage would then appear plagiarized, yielding a credible similarity score. This
may be done in a calculated fashion using the known frequency of usage of letters in the English
(or other) language. The letters may be listed by their frequency in ascending or descending order
(we evaluate both) and then excluded from scrambling in that order until the target percentage of
unaltered text is reached.
The by word method is similar to the previous, but instead of leaving some characters unscram-
bled in the custom font, the attacker leaves some words unaltered by not applying the custom
scrambling font to them. Here, words within the document may be listed in frequency of appear-
ance, ascending or descending, and excluded from the scrambling font in that order (we again
evaluate both). We also consider changing words at random with a probability targeting some
similarity score. This method may be more effective for an attacker in the long run, if Turnitin
implements a requirement that some percentage of words be found in a dictionary, English or oth-
erwise. In that case, this attack may be augmented by the previously described method of replacing
real words for other real words rendered as the originals.
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Figure 4.7: Effects of the percentage of text changed upon plagiarism similarity scores for 10 sample
documents.
4.5.2 Experiment
We use 10 already published papers retrieved from the Internet and mask the content in varying
degrees to see the effects on Turnitin’s returned similarity scores. We vary the amount a scrambling
font is applied to the text according to the previously described methods and upload the resultant
papers to Turnitin. Again, we target a specific range of similarity scores, between 5% and 15%,
such that a human grader is unlikely to suspect foul play.
Figure 4.7 plots the three methods. “Frequency descending” refers to the method of masking
words in the order of their frequency of appearance in the document, while “Letter usage descend-
ing” refers to masking letters by their frequency of usage. Ascending order proved unwieldy in
both cases and not worth displaying. Finally, “Random replacement” refers to the method of iter-
ating over all words and masking them with a probability of 1-100% in increments of 1%. These
are all plotted in terms of the percentage of text changed. Masking letters by their frequency of
usage results in a similarity curve that is too steep to be manageable for selecting a small range
of similarity scores. In contrast, the other two methods are very suitable for comfortably picking
a specific range. Any probability between 17% and 20% will net a similarity score in our desired
5-15% range in the case of randomly chosen masking. When words are replaced in order of their
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Search Engine Indexed Papers Attack Successful Evades Spam Detection Not Later Removed
Google 3 7 7 7
Bing 3 3 3 3
Yahoo! 3 3 Flagged / Cleared 3
DuckDuckGo 3 3 3 3
Table 1: Results of content masking attack on search engines.
written to automatically construct all these mappings, but
to make this more efficient, we offer an alternative - 84
fonts, in each of which all characters map to one masking
character. For example, in font “MaskAsA” character a
maps to a, b to a, 4 to a, ! to a, etc. To mask a document
as another, the attacker may simply apply fonts, charac-
ter by character, that correspond to the desired mask. At
the end of the documents, the three end behavior options
presented as part of Algorithm 1 and illustrated in Figure
1 function here as well, to handle the length variation.
6.2 Experiment
To demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, we obtained
a handful of well-known academic papers, masked their
content, and then placed them on one author’s university
website to be indexed by several leading search engines.
For this simple proof of attack, we only used one mask-
ing font which scrambled the letters for rendering. The
resulting papers have legible text that renders to gibber-
ish, meaning that if they can be located by searching for
that legible text, the search engine is fooled.
We submitted the site housing these papers to Google,
Bing, and Yahoo! and searched for them some days
later. Search engine DuckDuckGo does not accept web-
site submissions but we searched there as well. Table 1
lists the results of our content masking attack on these
search engines. “Indexed Papers” indicates the search
engine listed the papers in its index. “Attack Successful”
means they are indexed using the underlying text, not
the rendered gibberish. After a successful attack, the pa-
pers may later be put behind a spam warning or removed
from the index, as shown in the last two columns. We
found similar results for each of the 5 papers tested: that
Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo all indexed the papers
according to the masked legible text, and none removed
them later (at time of writing). Yahoo! did mark them as
spam after two days but confusingly some days after that
removed the spam warning.
Figure 8 illustrates this for one of tested paper. The
masked paper is shown in Figure 8a and contains no ren-
dered English words beyond what is shown. Figures 8b,
8c, and 8d show the search results for the legible underly-
ing text, and Figure 8e shows the spam warning appear-
ing days later but later disappearing. Each query was
(a) Gibberish paper
(b) Bing result for the gibberish paper
(c) DuckDuckGo result for the gibberish paper
(d) Yahoo! result for the gibberish paper
(e) Temporary Yahoo! spam warning
Figure 8: Results of the content masking attack against
popular search engines. The attack was not successful
against Google.
Figure 4.8: Results of content masking attack on search engines.
frequency of appearance, the 5-15% range may be achieved by replacing anywhere between 20 and
40% of the words, offering a very wide range of safety for the plagiarist.
4.6 D cument Indexing Subversi n
The final direction of this attack is against search engines, whether for the entire web or for
small document repositories or websites. Websites can implement a simple search returning pages
housing the query text, or they can use custom search engines offered by Google [71] or Yahoo!
[72]. Microsoft Bing also offers its API [73]. As small sites are unlikely to have a more sophisticated
search mechanism than the leading search engines, we target and demonstrate our attack against
these.
4.6.1 Method
We here consider modifying the ntire content of a PDF to render as something else. Both the
underlying text extracted by PDFMiner (or otherwise) and the rendered text should make sense
in this case, so that an individual searching for certain terms will be caused to find a PDF holding
those words but displaying something entirely different. This results in a more extreme version of
t e one-to-many character mapping challenge from the attack against topic matching. Instead of
masking a small finite number of words, we now examine masking the entire content. However,
this is facilitated by the realization that these masks are not necessarily delineated by spaces as
before; the ttacker can tre t he entire document as a single word to be masked. It consequently
encounters the word length disparity challenge, to treat the variation in length between real and
rendered text, but only once.
Nevertheless, the strategy of adding new fonts, ad hoc, to cover each new mapping quickly
balloons out of control, in terms of the attacker needing to keep track of what mappings appear
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in what font. The number of fonts will increase with the number of characters to be masked, to
an upper limit of every character needing a map to every other. Considering (for English) upper
and lower case letters, numbers, and common punctuation (22 symbols, dependent upon count),
all 26 + 26 + 10 + 22 = 84 characters must each map to the other 83 different characters, as well
as themselves for those cases which a character and its mask are the same. This requires 84 fonts
and represents 842 = 7056 mappings. Code can certainly be written to automatically construct all
these mappings, but to make this more efficient, we offer an alternative - 84 fonts, in each of which
all characters map to one masking character. For example, in font “MaskAsA” character a maps
to a, b to a, 4 to a, ! to a, etc. To mask a document as another, the attacker may simply apply
fonts, character by character, that correspond to the desired mask. At the end of the documents,
the three end behavior options presented as part of Algorithm 4.1 and illustrated in Figure 4.1
function here as well, to handle the length variation.
4.6.2 Experiment
To demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, we obtained a handful of well-known academic papers,
masked their content, and then placed them on one author’s university website to be indexed by
several leading search engines. For this simple proof of attack, we only used one masking font
which scrambled the letters for rendering. The resulting papers have legible text that renders to
gibberish, meaning that if they can be located by searching for that legible text, the search engine
is fooled.
We submitted the site housing these papers to Google, Bing, and Yahoo! and searched for them
some days later. Search engine DuckDuckGo does not accept website submissions but we searched
there as well. Table 4.8 lists the results of our content masking attack on these search engines.
“Indexed Papers” indicates the search engine listed the papers in its index. “Attack Successful”
means they are indexed using the underlying text, not the rendered gibberish. After a successful
attack, the papers may later be put behind a spam warning or removed from the index, as shown in
the last two columns. We found similar results for each of the 5 papers tested: that Bing, Yahoo!,
and DuckDuckGo all indexed the papers according to the masked legible text, and none removed
them later (at time of writing). Yahoo! did mark them as spam after two days but confusingly
some days after that removed the spam warning.
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(a) Gibberish paper
(b) Bing result for the gibberish paper (c) DuckDuckGo result for the gibberish paper
(d) Yahoo! result for the gibberish paper (e) Temporary Yahoo! spam warning
Figure 4.9: Results of the content masking attack against popular search engines.
Figure 4.9 illustrates this for one of tested paper. The masked paper is shown in Figure 4.9a and
contains no rendered English words beyond what is shown. Figures 4.9b, 4.9c, and 4.9d show the
search results for the legible underlying text, and Figure 4.9e shows the spam warning appearing
days later but later disappearing. Each query was appended with “site:XXX.edu” to isolate the
university website where they are hosted for this proof of concept.
Interestingly, Google indexed the papers, but according to the rendered gibberish, not the
underlying text. This indicates, of these four engines, only it performs OCR on PDF files it indexes
rather than extracting the text through PDFMiner or the like. After two days, the papers were
removed from Google’s index, before the authors obtained screenshots. We conclude that Google
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has a robust defense against the content masking attack, while the other three engines remain
susceptible.
4.7 Defense Against Content Masking
As intoned through this work, Optical Character Recognition (OCR) is able to move the text
extraction process from targeting the underlying text to the rendered version, preventing this
masking attack. OCR is required for print documents scanned to PDF, but for documents with
rendered text, system designers have been loath to use OCR in lieu of PDFMiner or its ilk. OCR
is far more complex and requires more processing time than simply running the PDF file through a
lightweight parser to collect its strings. However as just seen, Google seems to have placed a high
enough importance on accuracy to use OCR, and the other targets of our attack warrant at least as
much attention. It is therefore recommended to explore and implement in these environments some
usage of OCR to validate the integrity of the documents they process. OCR could be instead applied
to sections of a document at random, for larger documents, to reduce computational complexity
while allowing for some small false negative probability.
4.8 Related Work
Most exploit research targeting the PDF standard has been in bugs surrounding various pro-
grams rendering, displaying, exporting, or otherwise handling PDF documents. The not-for-profit
MITRE Corporation lists in its Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) collection 431 en-
tries involving the keyword “PDF” and having to do with these external programs [51]. These
allow for arbitrary code execution on the host computer and all the associated security risks [52],
including establishment of botnets, data exfiltration, and other high-impact security issues. They
are, however, limited to basic hacking-type exploits, zero-days chased by patches, and the PDF
itself is essentially a vehicle for the hack [53]. These attacks are not thematically novel, and the
patches indeed follow the zero-days with reasonable speed [54].
Similarly, some exploration has been performed on the JavaScript execution ability within the
PDF standard. When abused, this too allows for arbitrary code execution. Security researcher
Didier Stevens offers a series of blogs discussing how to misuse this JavaScript execution, including
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how to encode the strings involved to create polymorphic malware resisting simple signature-based
antivirus products [74]. Some research finds that writing polyglots (code valid in multiple languages)
within PDFs can expose security concerns depending on what language the reader uses to interpret
the code [48]. Successive updates to the PDF standard implement measures to block certain
functions, such as reaching out to the Internet, placing their function behind a confirmation window
for the user to view [58]. Additionally, most current antivirus products offer real-time protection
using heuristics that can detect potentially malicious behaviors despite simple code obfuscation.
Some academic research regarding PDF security analyzes the JavaScript being executed to verify
safety. One work analyzes a set of static features extracted from the PDF, and then instruments
with context monitoring code the JavaScript within. This combination static and runtime approach
is tested on a collection of 18623 PDF documents without malware and 7370 with, resulting in
few false negatives and no false positives [47]. Other research targets attacks not dependent on
JavaScript or other parsing vulnerabilities, including one that works to detect these attacks using
machine learning on existing flagged PDF files using data extracted from the structure of the file as
well as its content [49]. One may expect this strategy to suffer from the same difficulties experienced
by signature-based antivirus products, namely an inability to detect malware not already discovered
by researchers. Another work allows PDF documents to be opened in an emulated environment to
track how they behave before doing so in the host environment [50].
Some works slightly closer to ours examine the possibility of causing PDF documents to be
rendered differently on different computers, showing how to restrict the syntax of the PDF standard
to prevent this from occurring [75] [76]. This attack against data consistency has some vague
similarity to the concept of content masking - displaying different content for the human than the
machine. However, we provide several real-world examples of how our content masking attack
can subvert real systems, while the impact of the attack in this work is relatively limited to the
document looking different to humans using different computers. Some works [77] [78] [79] examine
poisoning search results, but this is from the perspective of presenting false data to the machine
through website code or manipulations of the PageRank algorithm via botnets, an existing threat
vector for which defenses have been continually adapting.
Section 4.2.1 introduces the Character Map (CMap), through which letters are mapped to
entries within fonts, ultimately displaying the associated glyphs. During our literature search, we
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found a work [59] from a social science journal of Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education
which touches on a similar topic from a non-scientific stance. [59] discusses how the CMap can
be altered to make letters map to different characters within a font. In this way, plagiarism
detection can be fooled by mapping to obscure characters whose glyphs are similar in appearance
to those for the typically used characters. After devising our attacks, we discovered this work also
contains cursory mention of the ability to modify the glyphs within a font, but does not explore this
possibility or demonstrate its practicality as we do. We evaluate new methods to target specific
similarity scores such that the resultant PDF does not appear unnatural with a 0% similarity score.
Further, we show how these custom fonts can be used to subvert conference reviewer-assignment
systems and search indexing, developing new and distinct attack methods specific to each of these
very different targets.
4.9 Summary
In this work, we have presented a new class of content masking attacks against the Adobe PDF
standard. After creating algorithms for each of three content masking attack variants, we per-
form a comprehensive evaluation showing that each lives up to its theory and operates in present
state-of-the-art systems. Our first attack allows academic paper writers and reviewers to collude
via subverting the automatic reviewer assignment systems in current use by academic conferences
including INFOCOM, which we simulated. This requires no visible changes to the paper being
reviewed and the addition of just 3-5 custom masking fonts for almost all of the 100 papers tested,
easily lost in any paper’s natural fonts. We show a second attack that renders ineffective plagia-
rism detection software, particularly Turnitin, to the point of being able to target specific small
plagiarism similarity scores to appear natural and evade detection. In our final attack, we success-
fully place masked content into the indexes for Bing, Yahoo!, and DuckDuckGo which renders as
information entirely different from the keywords used to locate it.
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CHAPTER 5
FUTURE WORK: PROBING AUDIO FINGERPRINTING AND YOUTUBE
CONTENT ID
5.1 Motivation
Because of YouTube’s monetization options, unethical individuals have an incentive to post and
profit off of content not created by them. Consequently, YouTube has developed the Content ID
system to detect stolen audio and video by comparing it against a database of content submitted by
rightful owners. Presently, adversaries will mirror, crop, stretch, alter playback speed of, or apply
color overlays to video to avoid detection, though this impairs the quality of the video [80, 81].
However, Content ID’s detection of stolen audio appears to be rather robust, with several forum
posts [82, 83, 84] and ban-avoidance guides [81, 85] indicating that posting copyrighted audio must
be avoided. There may yet be methods of fooling the Content ID system in order for an attacker
to monetize copyrighted audio.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Adversarial Examples
Though machine learning algorithms are becoming more adept at partitioning data sets and
classifying new inputs, they do not work in the same way as the human brain, and consequently
some surprises can arise in their usage and vulnerability.
5.2.1.1 Fooling Image Classification
Several works have identified and analyzed how very minor perturbations of images can cause
their misclassification by linear and non-linear classifiers. The method generally used is to add a
vector to the input equal to the sign function of the model weights (linear models) or of the cost
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function gradient with respect to the input (non-linear models). This exaggerates the higher-impact
features within a model, which can skew the results to a classification result where those features
are more pronounced [86]. However, this does not change the input in a human-discernible fashion,
so an image of a panda can be altered and misclassified as a gibbon, for example, while appearing
unchanged to humans.
5.2.1.2 Hidden Voice Commands
Some research has explored embedding vocal features into ambiguous noises such that humans
cannot detect them. These features can correspond to disruptive or privacy-violating voice com-
mands such as to call emergency services or posting the user’s location on social media. The authors
in [87] demonstrate successful attacks against known algorithms as well as black box systems, while
verifying with human volunteers that the sounds played are unidentifiable as the voice commands
embedded therein.
5.2.2 Audio Fingerprinting
At the heart of YouTube’s Content ID system, as it relates to audio, is audio fingerprinting.
Artists worldwide continuously create large volumes of original content that should be protected,
and YouTube’s popularity ensures that users upload extremely large volumes of new content per-
petually. When an artist submits an original song to YouTube’s Content ID database, it is infeasible
to simply store the song and compare all new uploads bitwise against a collection of millions of such
audio files. Various compression standards and audio formats exist, as does the possible presence of
noise or obfuscation, which make a simple comparison of audio files inconclusive. The audio must
be stored in a way that drastically reduces storage size while providing a fingerprint which can be
derived from any version of the audio such that it may be compared.
YouTube does not publish its Content ID algorithm, but audio fingerprinting has been accom-
plished in a robust manner by the song identification company Shazam, which has published its
algorithm [88]. The effectiveness of this algorithm suggests that YouTube may be using something
quite similar for its audio fingerprinting. First, a spectrogram is created for the song, by applying
the Fourier Transform and translating the song into frequency space. Certain frequencies now
appear more strongly than others within the song, which may be thresholded to identify all the
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Figure 5.1: Shazam audio fingerprinting algorithm [88].
peak frequencies at local maxima. These sets of coordinates are called constellations and represent
a huge decrease in storage space while effectively fingerprinting a song. Captured audio snippets
are subject to the same algorithm and resultant constellations searched for within the database to
determine what song is playing.
Figure 5.1, as presented in the Shazam paper [88], depicts the general audio fingerprinting
process, beginning with the translation into frequency space (Figure 5.1 A). Next, the thresholding
process is applied to the spectrogram (Figure 5.1 B), resulting in a large number of peaks. As
visible in the original spectrogram, stronger frequencies congregate toward the lower end of the
spectrum. Though the paper does not detail this, some filtering of peaks must be performed to
achieve the kind of even distribution shown in Figure 5.1 B, which ensures that all frequencies
are fairly represented. Figure 5.1 C illustrates that in the Shazam design, a constellation actually
consists of an anchor point and all those points in a “target zone” window located relative to the
anchor. In this way, a constellation is made for all of the filtered peaks, treating each in turn as
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Figure 5.2: Shazam matching algorithm tested on a database song and unrelated snippet [88].
an anchor point. Finally, the information to be stored in the database for each song is shown in
Figure 5.1 D, with entries for each relationship between anchor points and the peaks in their nearby
target zones. Each entry includes the anchor point time stamp and is indexed by the hash of the
concatenated anchor point frequency, target point frequency, and time delta between them.
Having fingerprinted the audio files in the above manner, the algorithm to search for a snippet
of music is simple [88]. The snippet is fingerprinted with the same parameters and the same type of
relationship information captured. The hashed frequencies and time delta information is searched
for within the database and corresponding anchor point time offsets found. Many false positives
will be found when those inter-peak relationships happen to exist in different songs. Figures 5.2
and 5.3 from the Shazam paper [88] contrast a snippet not matching and matching a database
song, respectively, with several matching hashes found in quick succession in the latter case. The
timestamps corresponding to these successive matching hashes form a strong diagonal shape in the
plot of database file time vs snippet time, indicating a match.
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Figure 5.3: Shazam matching algorithm tested on a database song and a snippet of the same song
[88].
5.3 Attack Methodology and Preliminary Results
Corrupting the audio fingerprinting process for a new video uploaded to YouTube is a potential
means to avoid the identification of copyrighted audio. YouTube ban-avoidance guides [81, 85]
advise talking over video clips with music present to obscure their sound, which will have some
similar effect. However, audio fingerprinting of songs is robust to noise or overlaid speech if the
snippet is long enough, because the frequencies of the song will be stronger than those of the noise
[88]. The following attack targets full songs and aims to refrain from modifying the audio in a
noticeable fashion, so another solution is needed. Fingerprints should be rendered unrecognizable
by altering the locations of appropriate peaks in the spectrogram, from which the constellations
are drawn. Because the frequency and time delta information is hashed to provide a key in the
database, any small change should prevent any constellations from matching. The experiments done
in this work utilize Shazam as an oracle to provide an educated guess whether or not YouTube
Content ID will be able to identify the sample audio. If Content ID detects copyright infringement,
YouTube will punish the account used, while identifying copyrighted songs is the intended function
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of Shazam. Shazam is therefore a safe, easy, and also more efficient means of testing which can
provide candidates to test against Content ID.
Before moving the spectrogram peaks, they must first be identified. As previously mentioned,
the Shazam paper does not explain how the most important peaks are identified. Selecting the
strongest n peaks quickly proves ineffective as stronger frequencies are concentrated at the bot-
tom of the spectrograms for typical music yet Figure 5.1 shows selected peaks evenly distributed
throughout the spectrogram. The preliminary work done on this attack utilizes [89] for Short-Time
Fourier Transformation (STFT) and its Inverse (ISTFT) and [90] for general peak finding. Of
multiple filters implemented, the one with the most convincing results breaks the spectrogram into
ten frequency bins and windows six seconds wide in each bin, selecting peaks above the mean peak
value for their respective windows.
Figure 5.4a shows the results of the peak finding and filtering algorithms for a sample 30
second song snippet. That there are many more peaks identified in this sample than the sample
in the Shazam paper is readily apparent, but the peaks found here are rather evenly distributed
throughout the spectrogram, as desired. If more peaks are filtered out, the distribution becomes
more sporadic, tending to concentrate at the lower end of each window because of the generally
higher frequency values in the lower ranges. This effect can be reduced by decreasing the size of
the windows used for mean calculation and comparison, but this risks overfitting the data. With
an even distribution as seen in Figure 5.4a, the greater coverage of a large number of peaks should
include the smaller number of peaks that the Shazam algorithm would likely pick.
Figure 5.4b shows the peaks found in an altered version of the spectrogram in Figure 5.4a.
Here, the peaks previously identified (and their surrounding neighborhoods) have been shifted in
a random direction horizontally, vertically, or diagonally. The two spectrograms appear rather
similar, but the peaks are in definitively different locales. This evinces a chance that the overall
sound may not have changed perceptibly while the peaks may be shifted enough to confuse the
audio fingerprinting/matching. Indeed, the audio whose spectrogram is pictured in Figure 5.4b is
not deciphered by Shazam, while the original audio (Figure 5.4a) is. However, to accomplish this,
the peaks are moved far enough that the audio does in fact suffer a loss of quality apparent to the
listener. Peak movement less than this is not sufficient to confuse Shazam, hence the requirement
for future work.
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(a) Unmodified peaks.
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(b) Modified peaks.
Figure 5.4: Results of the peak finding algorithm before and after moving peaks.
As mentioned, the implemented peak finding and filtering algorithms result in many more peaks
than the Shazam algorithm. Future work should strive to identify far fewer, more important peaks,
which will likely require an approach different from the windowing method currently used. The
failure of small peak movement to confuse an algorithm which is described as being contingent upon
the hash of peak locations indicates that some further undescribed or unpublicized preprocessing
must be taking place prior to hashing and storage/comparison (or that in the time since the Shazam
paper was published, hashing is no longer used). Selected peaks may be quantized in such a way to
allow for some variation while converging nearby peaks to standard intervals and thereby reducing
possible hash values. A method to circumvent this possibility is presently unknown, but more
experimentation may elucidate the situation.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This dissertation examines several everyday computer systems, looking for weaknesses and
reasoning out corresponding protective measures. Electric power grids are augmented with power
flow model camouflage to help identify when false data injection attacks are underway and deter
their success. A novel theft detection method for cars is offered making use of detected driving
behaviors to compare the current driver with the car owner. The PDF standard is shown to be
vulnerable to content masking attacks, wherein humans are caused to see different information than
computer systems extracting the underlying text, with various interesting implications. Finally, a
possible issue is identified with YouTube Content ID and some preliminary exploration carried out
thereupon.
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